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ARTICLE
A TAXONOMY FOR TAX LOOPHOLES
Heather M. Field*
ABSTRACT

Democrats, Republicans, media commentators and even
academics denounce "tax loopholes." Speakers may think that they
are talking about the same things, but this Article demonstrates
that people have widely divergent views about what tax loopholes
are. Thus, people criticizing loopholes often talk past each other
and engage in the tax equivalent of schoolyard name-calling. The
response to this problem is not, however, to try to define the
concept of "tax loopholes" with precision. Such an endeavor is
pointless. Instead, this Article provides a taxonomy for translating
the rhetoric of "tax loopholes" into more meaningful tax policy
discourse. This taxonomy posits that any reference to a "tax
loophole" should be understood in two dimensions-the tax policy
objection and the target of the criticism. Using numerous
examples from the popular/political discourse and the academic
literature, this Article catalogs alternatives on each dimension.
Categorizing any purported "tax loophole" using this taxonomy
provides a more productive framing of whatever critique is implied
by any use of the "loophole" label, thereby enabling the elevation
of the quality of the conversation about the individual tax
preference. This taxonomy may be particularly useful now, as the
debate continues about the consequences of recently-enacted tax
legislation.

*
Professor of Law & Eucalyptus Foundation Chair, University of California
Hastings College of the Law. I appreciate the opportunity to present this project at the
University of Washington Law School Tax Symposium and at the Law & Society
Association Annual Meeting, and I thank the participants, especially Ari Glogower, for
comments. Thanks also to Nick Bondar-Netis for his valuable research assistance.
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In addition, the taxonomy can be used in the aggregate to
provide insight into how groups of people perceive the tax system.
As an example, this Article applies the taxonomy to media
references to tax loopholes (from CNN, Fox, the Wall Street
Journal and the New York Times) during the 2016 presidential
campaign, thereby revealing how narratives about tax loopholes
varied by media source and ideological perspective.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Politicians decry tax loopholes. Legislators, policymakers,
media commentators, and academics call for action to close the tax
loopholes that riddle our tax system. Most speakers use the term
"tax loophole" without defining it, assuming (usually implicitly)
that "when [they] speak of loopholes [they] mean pretty much
what everybody else means."'
This Article demonstrates that people actually have widely
divergent views about what tax loopholes are. They do not agree
about which provisions constitute tax loopholes. 2 They do not
agree about the policy concerns that motivate them to characterize
something as a tax loophole.3 They do not agree about who is to
4
blame for tax loopholes or the problems tax loopholes create. And
they do not agree about what to do with the revenue that would be
raised by closing tax loopholes.5 Often, critics of loopholes are not
explicit about these details and let the negative connotation of the
term "loophole" express condemnation without providing a
substantive argument about why a tax preference is problematic
or about how the problem could be remedied. Thus, the term
"loophole" has, to a large degree, become the tax law equivalent of
calling someone a "loser"-empty schoolyard name-calling.
This impedes real communication about tax reform. People
are using the same term to denote dramatically different things.
Thus, people talk past each other, without a real appreciation for
the policy concerns that motivate each speaker. The "loophole"
rhetoric obfuscates, avoiding detail, "indiscriminately lumping

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Leo
See
See
See
See

Katz, A Theory of Loopholes, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2010).
infra Part II.A.
infra Part III.A.
infra Part III.B.
infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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together ... features of existing law [as] equally objectionable," 6
and thereby impeding people from being able to determine
whether and to what extent they agree about tax reform. It
condemns by association, without explanation: 7 if the "loophole"
label sticks, it can doom a tax provision without meaningful
consideration of its merits.8 It diverts attention away from policy
merits by focusing on impugning the character of anyone
associated with the loophole. 9 And it entrenches an "us versus
them" mentality, pitting groups of people (whether divided by
wealth, generation, political affiliation or otherwise) against each
other.10 Each of these rhetorical strategies" hinders deeper, more
substantive debate over the subject of, reasons for, and details of,
recent and possible future tax reforms.
Commentators have criticized the 'loophole" terminology
before. 12 Most prominently, Professor Boris Bittker, in 1973,
6.
Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes"and PoliticalRhetoric, 71 MICH. L. REV.
1099, 1127 (1973).
7.
See, e.g., infra notes 211-216 and accompanying text.
8.
See e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax
Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1160 (1957).
9.
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 6, at 1127 ("loophole" rhetoric implies that failure to
support loophole elimination is "a craven surrender to vested interests").
10.
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Address by the President to a Joint Session of
Congress (Sept. 8, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/08
/address-president-joint-session-congress (framing the loophole discourse by pitting oil
companies against small business, and millionaires and billionaires against teachers and
kids); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An Example, 70
TUL. L. REV. 2345, 2366-70 (1996) ("loophole" rhetoric pits generations against each other).
11.
These aspects of the "loophole" discourse reflect strategies of political rhetoric.
See, e.g., PAUL CORCORAN,

POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND RHETORIC xv (1979)

(political

language is used "not to stimulate thought, but to prevent it; not to convey information, but
to conceal or distort it; not to draw public attention, but to divert or suppress it"); MICHAEL
CALVIN MCGEE ET AL., RECOGNIZING MICROSTRUCTURAL FALLACIES IN ARGUMENTATION

AND PUBLIC ADVOCACY 2, 6 (John Louis Lucaites ed., 2012) (1976), http://www.indiana.edul
~c228/Fallacies.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2Z5-THDD] (the rhetorical strategy of encouraging
people to draw conclusions from association rather than causation); ALEX C. PARRISH,
ADAPTIVE RHETORIC: EVOLUTION, CULTURE, AND THE ART OF PERSUASION 35-50, 65 (2014)

(arguing that rhetoric helps us "form and strengthen group identity"); Martin Reisigl,
Analyzing Political Rhetoric, in QUALITATIVE

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL

SCIENCES 96-98 (RUTH WODAK & MICHAL KRZYZANOWSKI eds., 2008) (describing different
persuasive strategies of political rhetoric, including appeals to emotion (pathos) and to
character (ethos)); D.A. Strickland, On Ambiguity in PoliticalRhetoric: Defeat of the Rat
Control Bill in the House of Representatives, July 1967, 2 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 338, 339 (Sept.
1969) (describing the rhetorical strategy of "obfuscation" in which "the putative motive is
to avoid hard decision and to create the illusion of consensus" and which can involve
"utterances which the [speaker] takes to be precisely and intentionally ambiguous").
12.
See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 2361, 2371; TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV.,
The Complexity of the Tax Code, 1 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ANN. REP. CONG. 3, 10 (2012),
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-annual-report/downloads/most-seriousproblems-tax-code-complexity.pdf
[https://perma.ccM2DG-CHHW]
[hereinafter
The
Complexity of the Tax Code] ("[Tihe term 'loophole' has taken on a meaning that distorts
discussion.").

2018 ]

TAXONOMY FOR TAX LOOPHOLES

549

examined different types of "loopholes" that "dominate[d] the
discussion of federal income tax reform" in an effort to "rescue the
federal income tax from the superheated rhetoric of its populist
friends."1 3 Unfortunately, the "loophole" rhetoric persisted
undiminished, in part (though certainly not entirely) because
Professor Bittker focused on defining and describing the rhetoric
and did not provide a strategy for overcoming it.14
This Article, in contrast, provides a methodology for
translating the rhetoric of "tax loopholes" into meaningful tax
policy discourse. Specifically, this Article argues for using a
taxonomy to interpret any reference to a "tax loophole." This
taxonomy posits that any reference to a "tax loophole" should be
understood in two dimensions-the normative tax policy objection
and the party that is the target of the criticism.
Categorizing any purported "tax loophole" on these two axes
provides a more productive framing of whatever critique is implied
by the use of the term "loophole." The taxonomy provides speakers
with a framework for more explicitly articulating the substantive
critique they intend to make, and it helps listeners ask good
questions so they can ascertain the policy concerns implicated by
someone who talks about loopholes. Moreover, it counteracts the
rhetorical strategies mentioned above, thereby making more
transparent (and less powerful) the use of the term "tax loophole"
as a device to spin the political debate. More broadly, by breaking
through the rhetoric of "loopholes" and reframing the discourse to
be less superficial, more policy-oriented, and more actionable, it
can elevate the quality of the conversation surrounding tax reform.
The more we understand why different people favor or disfavor
certain provisions and what they want done in response, the more
we can engage in meaningful dialogue.
Admittedly, political rhetoric-including even tax loophole
rhetoric-can have value. For example, rhetoric can provide a
helpful shorthand for making complex policy issues salient to the
public and can provide rallying cries around which coalition
building can occur, possibly facilitating law reform. 15 Stylistic
framing, not just substantive merit, can affect whether an
initiative succeeds. However, the rhetorical framing of an issue,
particularly for an issue as important as tax reform, ought to be

13.
Bittker, supranote 6, at 1102, 1127.
14.
See infra pp. 118-19 (further distinguishing this Article from Professor Bittker's).
See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 2371 ("Rhetoric is appropriate and
15.
inevitable as people try to convince each other that their vision of society is the correct one.").
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backed up by thoughtful, substantive policy arguments,1 6 which
are sorely lacking in the current tax loophole rhetoric.
Yet it would be naive, however, to think that the tax loophole
rhetoric is the only hurdle to bipartisan tax reform1 7 or that the
lack of consensus about how to change the tax law arises only
because of a failure to communicate. There are legitimate, strongly
held differences of opinion about the appropriate size of
government, the appropriate degree of progressivity in the tax
system, what activities the tax system should incentivize, and how
effective those incentives are, etc. However, particularly as we
reflect on recently-enacted tax legislation18 and as we discuss what
planning opportunities and problems are created by the new law,1 9
what role the Treasury Department should play in curtailing such
opportunities and solving such problems through regulatory
guidance, 20 and what additional reforms this or a future Congress
might pursue, 21 it is better to strive for meaningful and
substantive conversations about those differences than it is to
continue unabated using the hollow "loophole" label.
Moreover, even if the insights provided by the taxonomy are
not used to improve the discourse about recent or future tax
legislation, the taxonomy still improves our ability to understand
each other. This improved understanding is not limited to the
interpretation of individual comments about loopholes. The
taxonomy also provides insight into multi-speaker debates about
particular tax preferences (e.g., the debate about the "carried

16.
Id. ("Such a monumental issue as tax deserves a great deal of reasoned analysis
and thought.")
Although tax legislation was enacted at the very end of 2017, only Republicans voted
17.
for the bill; all Democrats and Independents voted against the bill. Final Vote Results for Roll
Call 699, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll699.xml [https://perma.cc/935C-DCUN] (showing
the votes in the House of Representatives); Roll Call Vote 115th Congress 1st Session, Vote No.
323, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call-lists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?congress=115
&session=1&vote00323 [https://perma.cc/J4BW-TREJ] (showing the votes in the Senate).
18.
Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97 (to be codified in 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
2017 Tax Act].
19.
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., The Games They Will Play: An Update on
the Conference Committee Tax Bill, SSRN (Dec. 18, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=3089423; Natalie Kitroeff, In a Complex Tax Bill, Let the Hunt for
Loopholes Begin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/27/
business/economy/tax-loopholes.html.
20.
See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, Treasury Can Close a Potential Loophole in the
Treatment of Deferred Foreign Income in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act - Will It Act?, SSRN
(Dec. 26, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3093379.
See, e.g., Dylan F. Moroses et al., Extenders Will Wait Until 2018, Brady Says,
21.
158 TAX NOTES 65 (2018) (discussing possible technical corrections to the new tax law,
legislation to extend other expiring tax provisions, and the possibility that "if Democrats
were to win back the majorities in the House and Senate in the 2018 midterm elections,
changes to the just-passed Republican tax bill would be more than likely").
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interest loophole"). 22 And the taxonomy can be used, in the
aggregate, to better understand groups of people and how they
perceive the tax system (e.g., how the "tax loophole" discourse
leading up to the 2016 presidential election differed among media
sources with different ideological orientations). 23
Ideally, this Article's taxonomy would replace the use of the
term "loophole," but unless and until the word "loophole" is
eliminated from the discourse about taxes (a prospect about which
I am not sanguine), the taxonomy at least translates the term
"loophole" into more substantive concepts. Notably, this Article
does not try to provide a definitive definition of "loophole." The
term "tax loophole" has no independent import, so defining it with
precision has little value. 24 There is no "truth of the matter" as to
whether a particular provision is or is not a "tax loophole."
Whether a tax preference merits "the appellation 'loophole' is a
matter of viewpoint." 25 Thus, it is more useful to provide a
framework that provides insight into why the speaker judges the
particular tax preference to be worthy of the pejorative "tax
loophole" label.
One note about this Article's terminology is warranted.
Because this Article seeks to deconstruct the "tax loophole"
terminology, this Article uses the more neutral terms "tax
preference" or "tax benefit" to refer to tax-reduction opportunities
that commentators might (or might not) categorize as "loopholes."
Although there is no perfectly neutral term, the use of the terms
"tax preference" and "tax benefit" is merely intended to refer to a
particular opportunity through which a taxpayer may reduce her
tax bill (i.e., something that treats the taxpayer preferentially,
conferring on her a personal monetary benefit). Unlike the term
"tax loophole," which connotes judgment, these terms are not
intended to convey approval or disapproval of the relevant tax
treatment; rather, they are intended to identify a situation that
some might label as a "tax loophole," so that the taxonomy can be
applied.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II surveys
different definitions for the term "tax loophole" and argues against
investing more effort in trying to reach a consensus definition for
the term.

22.
See infra Part IVA.
See infra Part IV.B. (analyzing the 'loophole" discourse from CNN, Fox, The Wall
23.
Street Journal, and The New York Times).
24.
See infra Part II.B.
25.
Surrey, supra note 8, at 1148; see also infra Part II.A.
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Part III provides the taxonomy for translating "tax loophole"
rhetoric into more meaningful discourse. Specifically, Part III.A
categorizes the use of the term 'loophole" by the normative policy
objection implied by the use of the term, and Part III.B categorizes
the use of the term loophole" by the people who are the targets of
the implied criticism. Using numerous examples from the
popular/political discourse and the academic literature, Part III
catalogs alternatives on each dimension.
Part IV demonstrates two applications of the taxonomy. Part
IV.A uses the taxonomy to parse the competing concerns that
motivate the multi-speaker debate about the "carried interest
loophole." Part IV.B conducts a study of CNN transcripts, Fox
transcripts, Wall Street Journal articles, and New York Times
articles referencing tax loopholes during the 2016 presidential
campaign, and applies the taxonomy to these articles/transcripts
in order to better understand how media outlets with different
ideological perspectives discuss tax loopholes and the tax system.
Part V concludes this Article.
II. THE ELUSIVE MEANING OF "TAx LOOPHOLE"

Few commentators explicitly try to define the term "tax
loophole." 2 6 Most commentators, even in the academic literature,
give a cursory definition 27 or merely imply a definition from the
context in which they use the term. 28 This Part draws on this
literature, whether or not it is explicit about the definition of "tax
loopholes," in order to demonstrate that commentators have
dramatically different definitions of the term. Then this Part
argues that the search for a precise definition is futile and should
be abandoned in favor of the taxonomy provided in Part III.
A.

What is a "Tax Loophole"?

The Webster's New World College Dictionary provides insight
into the origin of the term "loophole," explaining that a 'loophole"
is "a hole or narrow slit in the wall of a fort, etc., for looking or

See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 6, at 1102-03, 1109, 1112-13; Monte Jackel,
26.
Exploiting Tax Loopholes, 139 TAX NOTES 669, 669 (2013); Linda Evans, Obstacles to
Federal Tax Reform: An Exploratory Inquiry Into the Fiscal Attitudes of a Small Group of
Taxpayers, 37 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOLOGY 71, 74-79 (1978).
27.
See, e.g., Katz, supra note 1, at 2.
28.
See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, The Loophole that Would Not Die: A Case Study in
the Difficulty of Greening the Internal Revenue Code, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 469,
473-74 (2011) (implying that a loophole confers a benefit on people who were not
anticipated beneficiaries).
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shooting through." 29 "The etymology of the term "loophole" traces
to the arrow slits cut in medieval castle walls. The loophole
provided a crack or perforation that permitted the archer to peer
through and fire his weapon." 30
As relevant today, Webster's New World College Dictionary
defines "loophole" to be "a means of escape; esp., a means of
evading or escaping an obligation, enforcement of a law or
contract, etc." 3 1 Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines a
"loophole" to be "[a]n ambiguity, omission, or exception (as in a law
or other legal document) that provides a way to avoid a rule
without violating its literal requirements; esp., a tax-code
provision that allows a taxpayer to legally avoid or reduce income
taxes." 32

Thus, common uses of the term "tax loophole" refer to tax
benefits that are available because of "statutory ambiguities and
omissions," 33 where a tax benefit is available due to a "[1]inguistic
[s]ome texts are too narrowly drawn ... [o]ther
imperfection ...
texts seem overly broad and ambiguous"

34

or where a tax benefit

is created as an unavoidable part of the process of writing and
enacting laws. 3 5 Some commentators explain that "tax loopholes"
are tax benefits that comply with "the letter of the law but
some
Similarly,
spirit." 3 6
violat[e]
its
simultaneously
commentators, when defining "tax loopholes," focus on Congress's
intent 37 by describing "tax loopholes" as tax preferences that were
unintended or unanticipated by Congress, 38 including but not
29.

Loophole, WEBSTER'S

NEW

WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (5th

ed.,

2014),

http://www.yourdictionary.com/loophole#websters [https://perma.cc/NQ2W-BUTS].
30.
Daniel T. Ostas, Corporate Counsel, Legal Loopholes, and the Ethics of
Interpretation,18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 703, 704 (2012).
31.
Loophole, supra note 29
Loophole, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014).
32.
33.
Bittker, supra note 6, at 1102-09; see also, e.g., Joshua Blank, What's Wrong With
Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV. 539, 565 (2009) (relying on a dictionary
definition of 'loophole," and understanding tax loopholes as "tax benefits that take
advantage of such an 'ambiguity or omission' in the .. . tax law").
34.
Ostas, supra note 30, at 704-05.
35.
Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX
REV. 339, 366 (2005) ("it simply is not possible to write tax laws that are devoid of all
unintended loopholes"); Katz, supranote 1, at 17-25 (discussing how the legislative process
makes it impossible to avoid creating loopholes).
36.
Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws: Examining the
Ethical Dimensions of CorporateLegal Strategy, 46 Am. BUS. L.J. 487, 509 (2009); see also,
e.g., Katz, supranote 1, at 2 ("glitches in the formulation of a law ... [that enable] clients
[to] do things that appear to subvert its purpose").
This definition assumes that Congressional intent can be readily ascertained, a task
37.
which sometimes presents challenges. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324-39 (1990).
38.
See, e.g., Senator Orrin Hatch, Debunking the Myths of So-Called Tax
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limited to situations where "the Code has been applied to
structures to which it was not intended" 39 or situations at "the
intersection of different unrelated provisions of the tax code that
produce an unanticipated tax advantage." 40 Yet others focus on the
role of tax advisers and on the planning required to take
advantage of the tax benefit, defining tax loopholes to be tax
planning opportunities or strategies discovered by "clever tax
advisors." 4 1
There is overlap between these definitions. For example, a tax
adviser might discover an ambiguity in a statute that could
support an interpretation that is different than Congress may
have intended. But these definitions are not entirely co-extensive.
For example, the benefit of a tax provision could be unintended
and unanticipated (e.g., because the technology to which it applies
was not invented at the time Congress enacted the particular
provision), but the application of that tax provision to the new
context might be perfectly aligned with the spirit of the law. Or
perhaps the tax benefit could be the product of how multiple
perfectly clear and unambiguous rules intersect, albeit in a way
that, in the aggregate, was unintended by Congress.
Moreover, several definitions and common uses of the term
"tax loophole" directly conflict with the definitions above. Some
commentators use the term "tax loophole" to include tax
preferences that are deliberately provided by Congress and used
by taxpayers as Congress intended. 42 Some commentators focus on
Expenditures, UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE: RANKING MEMBER'S NEWS

(Jul. 12, 2011), https://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-news/debunking-themyths-of-so-called-tax-expenditures [https://perma.cclUBU4-KAPJ] [hereinafter SENATE
FINANCE COMMITTEE] ("A loophole is something that Congress did not intend"); Sheldon D.
Pollack, Arenas of Federal Tax Policy, 135 TAx NOTES 1499, 1505-06 (2012) ("unintended
tax benefits').
39.
David J. Herzig, Am I the Only Person Paying Taxes: The Largest Tax Loophole
for the Rich - Exchange Funds, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 503, 509 (2009).
40.
Pollack, supra note 38, at 1505-06.
41.
PRES. ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GRowTH:
PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAx SYSTEM 4-5 (2005), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-

center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-Tax-System-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAS8-BHT3];
see also, e.g., Katz, supra note 1, at 2; Bittker, supra note 6, at 1109-12 ("[T]he term
'loophole' often also reflects the widely held view that tax experts have a magical power to
reduce taxes."); Jackel, supranote 26, at 669 (providing several definitions of tax loopholes,
with the lawyer's role being central to many).
42.
See, e.g., Harry J. Rudnick, A Better Design for Loopholes, 7 CHALLENGE 24, 24
(1959) (referring to "important loopholes which have been deliberately provided by congress
for the very purpose of permitting certain taxpayers [to benefit]"); Evans, supranote 26, at
74 (arguing that tax reformers, when referring to "tax loopholes" "are referring to any tax
provision which is available to some and not to others ... . [including] all existing tax
exemptions, deductions and credits"); see also Bittker, supra note 626, at 1112-13; Kyle D.
Logue, Optimal Tax Complianceand Penalties When the Law is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV.
241, 249 n.10 (2007) ("an intended tax loophole ... describe[s] those provisions in the tax
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those tax preferences deliberately provided to special interest
groups or the wealthy. 43 Others employ a broader definition of
"loophole" that encompasses all deliberately provided tax
preferences, including the "mortgage interest [deduction],
[exclusion for the value of] healthcare, [tax-deferred] buildup in
pensions, [deduction for] property taxes, and [deduction for]
charitable contributions." 44 Indeed, some commentators treat all
tax expenditures as "tax loopholes," 45 but others strongly object to
this definition of "loopholes," explaining that "[t]ax expenditures
are not loopholes" 46 or commenting that it is "impossible to
understand how one can possibly characterize a specific and
purposeful legislative enactment as . . . 'a loophole'." 47
Some go further to include as "loopholes" not only tax
expenditures or tax benefits available through tax planning, but
any "gaps in the tax base,"48 "provisions that enable people to avoid

any tax based on how they earn income or how they spend
income," 49 or, in the most expansive approach, anything that
legally reduces tax.5 0 This could include preferential capital gains
laws designed to subsidize certain activities.").
43.
See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: EliminateEverybody's Loopholes
Except Mine, 134 TAx NOTES 922 (2012) (quoting an exchange about deliberately provided
special interest provisions); Surrey, supra note 8, at 1148; AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC
ACTION, A GUIDE TO THE AMERICAN LOOPHOLE SYSTEM: THE ADA TAX REFORM MANUAL ii

(1976) (explaining that "expenditure-loopholes [ ] increasingly have permitted the rich to
use the tax system to get richer" and citing several intentionally enacted tax expenditures
as evidence).
44.
Meg Shreve, Conversations:Bill Bradley, 133 TAX NOTES 303, 305 (2011); see also,
e.g., Paul H. Douglas, The Problem of Tax Loopholes (Or: My Eighteen Years in a Quandary),
37 AM. SCHOLAR 21, 33-34 (1968) (criticizing, as "loopholes," provisions such as the
exclusion for interest on municipal bonds).
45.
See, e.g., Shreve, supra note 44; see also Charles E. McLure Jr., Ruminations on
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 135 TAX NOTES 345, 346 n.7 (2012) (noting that terms such as
"loopholes" and "tax preferences" are used interchangeably to denote deviations from the
Haig-Simons definition of income); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX
REV. 205, 211, 241 (2012) (explaining that "tax expenditures ... are commonly referred to
as tax 'loopholes"').
46.
Pollack, supra note 38; SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, supra note 38 ("Whether
you agree with a particular tax expenditure or not, an honest debate requires recognition
that tax expenditures were designed by Congress with economic or social goals in mind and
are not inadvertent loopholes."); John L. Buckley, Tax Expenditure Reform: Some Common
Misconceptions, 132 TAX NOTES 255, 256-57 (2011) (similar).
47.
Joseph R. Crosby, Letter to the Editor, Let's Be Clear on Definition of 'Loophole,'
26 STATE TAX NOTES 124 (2002).
48.
David A. Weisbach, Disruptingthe Market for Tax Planning,26 VA. TAX REV. 971,
973 (2007).
49.
Daniel J. Mitchell, Everything You Need to Know about Deductions, Loopholes,
and Special-Interest Tax Provisions, CATO AT LIBERTY (Nov.
30,
2015),
https://www.cato.org/blog/everything-you-need-know-about-deductions-loopholes-specialinterest-tax-provisions [https://perma.cc/38NM-J26Z].
50.
See, e.g., George F. James, Jr., The Loophole-Closing Revenue Act of 1937, 23 AM.
BAR ASS'N. J. 759, 759 (1937) ("[D]evices within the letter of the revenue laws for the
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rates, 5 ' nonrecognition provisions, 52 the failure of our income tax
system to tax imputed income from owner-occupied housing, 53 and
even the realization requirement (enabling assets to appreciate
tax-free until disposition). 54
Given this wide range of definitions for the term "tax
loophole," it is understandable that some commentators criticize
the use of the term as "suffer [ing] from . . . vagueness of ...
concept"5 5 or as being "used quite loosely and without critical

reflection."5 6 One commentator, valiantly trying to provide some
guidance about what "tax loopholes" are, suggested that "loophole"
could mean several things:
*

The law provides for a designated result but
it is apparent from the text of the law that
the result was not intended by the drafters of
the statute or regulation. Within this
category would be mistakes written into the
law by Congress or the IRS, or language that
reads as the tax lawyer and his client
intended but is not what the IRS or Congress
intended the language to actually mean.

*

The law provides for a specific result
advocated by special interest groups, and the
tax lawyer is merely taking advantage of

purpose of avoiding taxes .....
51.
See, e.g., James Kwak, The Most Important Tax Break Is the One That Nobody
Talks About, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2012/1 1/the-most-important-tax-break-is-the-one-that-nobody-talks-about/265308
[https://perma.cc/L2C2-5GAC] ("The loophole for [preferential rates on] investment income
is one of the biggest ones that exist . . . .").
52.
See, e.g., Chuck Marr, The Tax Loophole of 2016: Like-Kind Exchange, CENTER ON
BUDGETAND POLICY PRIORITIES (May 18, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/blog/the-tax-loophole-of2016-like-kind-exchange [https://perma.cclSH36-FPEK] (condemning the nonrecognition
provision of Section 1031 as a "major tax loophole that policymakers should close").
53.
See, e.g., American Bar Association, Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer
Taxes Task Force on Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, 58 TAX LAW. 93, 294 (2004) (Dennis L.
Belcher, Chair, & Mary Louise Fellows, Reporter) ("recogniz[ing] imputed income for
personal use . . . [would] clos[e] a potentially major loophole . . .. "); Gerard M. Brannon,
Tax Loopholes as OriginalSin: Lessons from Tax History, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1763, 1767-69
(1986) (discussing the non-taxation of imputed rents as one such "original sin").
54.
See, e.g., Brannon, supra note 53, at 1769-73 (discussing the realization requirement
as another such original sin); Sunday Morning Futures (Fox television broadcast Jan. 17, 2016)
(criticizing as a legal loophole/dodge, Warren Buffet's ability to not pay current tax on his
"unrealized capital gains," implicitly due to the realization requirement).
55.
Joseph P. McKenna, Tax Loopholes: A ProceduralProposal, 16 NAT'L TAX J. 63,
63 (1963).
56.
Ostas, supra note 30, at 703.
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what Congress or the IRS bestowed on
taxpayers who can afford high-priced tax
advice.
*

The law provides for a specific result but only
wealthy individuals and large corporations
have sufficient income or assets to take
advantage of the law.

*

The common law doctrines of economic
substance,
sham,
step
transaction,
substance versus form, etc., would prevent
the intended result desired by the tax lawyer
and the client but, because of the ambiguity
in applying these doctrines to the facts at
hand, it is concluded that these doctrines do
not apply.

*

The law is unclear as to the intended result
and can be argued either way. Even though
the intended result "is too good to be true,"
the tax lawyer and his client take advantage
of this gray area and implement the
transaction after the lawyer gives a written
opinion that the taxpayer should prevail. 7

These definitions are wide-ranging, including intended and
unintended tax benefits and including tax benefits that are
broadly available and that are only available for a limited group.
Further, the author offers this list of definitions as merely
"illustrative and not exclusive,"58 meaning that, even to this
author, "tax loopholes" could encompass an even broader array of
tax preferences.
Given the wide range of possible definitions and the lack of
consensus about a definition of "tax loophole," some people use the
term "tax loopholes" merely to refer to tax benefits provided "to
some [people] and not to others" 5 9 or, more specifically, tax benefits
that "are available to someone other than oneself."6 0 More
generally, "the use of the appellation 'loophole' is [often merely] a
57.
Jackel, supranote 26, at 669.
58.
Id. at 669 n.2.
59.
Evans, supranote 26, at 74.
Id. at 77, 79 (stating that people "tended not to see any tax provision they used to
60.
avoid taxes as a 'loophole"').
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matter of viewpoint," 6 1 with "one person's loophole [being] another
person's 'benefit"' 62 or even "another taxpayer's lifeline." 63 Indeed,
"too often the term [tax loophole] means . . . some provision of the
tax code which the speaker opposes." 64
Commentary about the tax legislation enacted in late 2017
provides a recent example of the widely divergent definitions of
the term "tax loophole." Republican leaders touted their success in
"clos[ing] wasteful loopholes" and enacting pro-growth tax
reform. 65 In contrast, Democratic leaders condemned both the
2017 Tax Act's failure to close existing loopholes and its creation
of "huge new loopholes."6 6 Politicians spoke about the same new
law, referred to the same new provisions and used the same "tax
loophole" terminology, but they clearly meant very different
things.
Despite the lack of consensus on the definition of "tax
loophole," there are a couple of parameters on which
commentators generally agree.
First, most references to "loopholes" are pejorative and intend
to express criticism. 67 There are limited circumstances in which
61.
Surrey, supra note 8, at 1148.
62.
Dave Rifkin, An Overview ofthe 'Tax Gap', 86 TAXES: THE TAX MAGAZINE 27 n.9 (2008).
63.
The Complexity of the Tax Code, supra note 12, at 10.
McKenna, supra note 55, at 63; see also, e.g., The Complexity of the Tax Code, supra
64.
note 12, at 10 ("[T]axpayers and policymakers use the term 'loophole' to describe a tax
expenditure that they do not agree with (or do not benefit from).'); Katherine Mangu-Ward,
Everything is Bad. Blame the Tax Code., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/04/opinion/sunday/republicans-taxes-loop-holes.html ("[M]ost people tend to reserve
that word ["loophole"] for special tax treatment they don't like").
Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, Remarks on the Senate Floor in
65.
Washington D.C. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.republicanleader.senate.gov/newsroom/
remarks/we-took-money-out-of-washingtons-pocket-and-put-it-back-in-the-pockets-of-thefamilies-who-earned-it [https://perma.cc/BF6B-XMND]; see also, e.g., White House Fact
Sheets, The Tax Cuts Act Follows through on President Donald J. Trump's Promise of
Middle Class Tax Cuts, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/tax-cuts-act-follows-president-donald-j -trumps-promise-middle-classtax-cuts/ [https://perma.cc[BY3C-4J2D] ("The Tax Cuts Act enacts pro-growth reform,
putting American businesses on a level playing field with foreign competitors.... The Tax
Cuts Act will eliminate dozes of special interest tax breaks and loopholes.").
66.
Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator, Statement at Conference Committee on Republican Tax
Plan (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-news/wyden-statementat-conference-committee-on-republican-tax-plan [https/perma.cclYK7R-W4U8]; see also, e.g.,
Chuck Schumer, U.S. Senator, Schumer Statement on GOP Tax Bill (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-statement-on-goptax-bill [https://perma.cc/2SZR-TFDQ] (arguing that the tax bill will "swindle[e] the middle
class and loosen[ ] loopholes for the wealthy"). But see Jonathan Curry, White House Regrets
Not Axing Carried Interest, Cohn Says, 158 TAX NOTES 55 (2018) (citing a White House
representative "affirm[ing] that Trump still views carried interest as a loophole" and
acknowledging that the tax legislation did not fix it).
See, e.g., Infanti, supra note 45, at 250 ("Max 'loopholes'-a pejorative term that
67.
evokes a gap in, or departure from, the theoretically appropriate tax base.").
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references to "loopholes" have positive connotations. This occurs,
for example, when someone is trying to sell a tax benefit (or
materials that provide the key to obtaining the tax benefit) to
taxpayers.6 8 And occasionally, the term "loophole" will be used
with "a dash of admiration" for the tax adviser who figured out
how to obtain the particular tax benefit.6 9 Nevertheless, most uses
of the term "loophole" bear negative connotations. The challenge,
which will be tackled in Part III.A, is deciphering why the speaker
is criticizing the particular tax preference.
Second, most references to "loopholes" accept that the tax
benefit obtained is legal, or at least, that a colorable argument can
be made that the tax benefit is legal. Occasionally, people will
"fail[] to make a clear distinction between loopholes which are
legal and acts of falsification which are not,"7 0 and will assert that
"[s]ome of the loopholes that have been used are not 'true
allowances"' and "don't comply with existing law and IRS
regulations."7 1 Others suggest that "loopholes" might include tax
benefits that would be illegal under current law if only judicial
anti-abuse doctrines were more rigorously applied, 72 or refer to
both clearly legal provisions and provisions of dubious legality
when discussing loopholes. 73 But generally, even critics of "tax
loopholes" generally concede that the tax benefit, while
objectionable, is legal (or at least arguably legal) under the
applicable law. 7 4
See, e.g., DIANE KENNEDY, LOOPHOLES OF THE RICH: HOW THE RICH LEGALLY
68.
MAKE MORE MONEY AND PAY LESS TAX (2004); EVA ROSENBERG, DEDUCT EVERYTHING!:
SAVE MONEY WITH HUNDREDS OF LEGAL TAX BREAKS, CREDITS, WRITE-OFFS, AND
LOOPHOLES (2016).

Bittker, supranote 6, at 1102.
69.
Evans, supra note 26, at 78-79.
70.
Amy S. Elliott & Marie Sapirie, Microsoft, Hewlett-PackardCalled Out for Offshore
71.
Tax Practices, 136 TAX NOTES 1506, 1506 (Sept. 24, 2012) (quoting Senator Carl Levin).
See, e.g., Jackel, supra note 26, at 669; see also generallyBittker, supra note 6, at
72.
1110-11 (explaining that courts "regularly" use "judicial doctrines ... to deflate ingenious
and initially promising [loophole] schemes"); Ostas, supra note 36, at 510 ("Judicial
attitudes toward the exploitation of legal loopholes can be somewhat ambivalent ....
[Sometimes,] courts will condemn arguments based on loopholes as shams, frauds, and
violations of law ... [and] look[ ] through form to substance ... . [meaning that] sometimes
arguments based on legal loopholes work; sometimes they do not.")
See, e.g., Joe Thorndike, Tax History- Civilization at a Discount: The Morality of
73.
Tax Avoidance, 95 TAX NOTES 664, 664-65 (2002) (describing FDR's "antiloophole crusade"
as targeting both "legally suspect loopholes" and loopholes with "secure legal status").
74.
See Rifkin, supra note 62, at 27 n.9 ("A 'loophole' is not cheating, attending to
evade taxes due and owing, failing to file a return, underreporting of income or an
underpaying taxes due and owing."); Evans, supra note 26, at 78-79 (treating legality as
part of the baseline definition of loopholes); see also, e.g., Elliott & Sapirie, supra note 71
(quoting Senator Tom Coburn as "acknowledging that he did not like [the tax avoidance
strategies referred to by his colleague as illegal loopholes]" but saying "the techniques are
'properly legal tax avoidance"').
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Despite these two points of general agreement, a definition for
"tax loophole" remains elusive.
B.

The (Lack of) Value in Defining "Tax Loophole"

As illustrated by the foregoing, there is no consensus on the
definition of "tax loophole." Trying to define "tax loophole"
presents challenges that are similar to (and intertwined with)
those encountered when trying to define the closely-related
concepts of tax shelters and tax expenditures.7 5 Commentators
and policymakers have spent considerable effort trying to define
these terms, and the endeavors have proven controversial,
spawning abundant literature on both tax shelters 76 and tax
expenditures.7 7
A critical difference, however, between the debate about the
definition of tax loopholes and the debates about the definitions of
tax shelters and tax expenditures is that the latter debates have
meaningful consequences.
If a transaction is a "tax shelter," then special penalty
provisions,7 8 disclosure and list-keeping requirements,7 9 and

75.
See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Foreword, 55 TAX L. REV. 125, 127 (2002) ("The
difficulty with defining shelters is that, like Justice Potter Stewart, we know them when
we see them, but we apparently cannot agree either on what we are seeing or how to
describe what we see."); Logue, supra note 42, at 263 n.45 ("One of the biggest issues in the
tax shelter literature, arguably the central issue in that debate, is the question of how to
distinguish the unintended from the intended tax loopholes.").
76.

See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-19-02, BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LAW

RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS 2 (Mar. 19, 2002) ("[T]axpayers and tax administrators have
struggled in determining the line between legitimate 'tax planning' and unacceptable 'tax
shelters."'); David P. Hariton, How to Define "CorporateTax Shelter", 136 TAX NOTES 169,
169 (2012); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths about Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible
Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 328, 334-40 (2002)
(describing several categories of tax shelters, but lamenting that "there is no established
definition of the term"); Calvin H. Johnson, What's a Tax Shelter? 68 TAX NOTES 879, 879
(1995) ("There is no consensus definition of a 'tax shelter' in the law or legal literature.").
77.
See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 972-82 (2004) (summarizing the debate about the
definition of tax expenditures, and explaining that "the particular details [about what is
included in the "normative tax base" and what constitutes a deviation therefrom] vary by
individual tax expert"); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal 'Tax Subsidies' in the
National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244, 244-47 (1969) (critiquing the scope of the tax
expenditure concept); see also generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM:

THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 6-7 (1973) (foundational work setting out the concept
of tax expenditures); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX

EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016-2020, 1-20 (Jan. 30, 2017) (explaining that "[t]ax
expenditures are defined under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974" and discussing the application of that definition).
78.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(C), 6662A, 6694(a)(2)(C), 6700, 6707A, 6708.
79.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6011, 6111, 6112.
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standards of practice are imposed.80 Some of the relevant
provisions employ slightly different definitions of "tax shelter,"
and many refer to "reportable transactions" rather than "tax
shelters" per se.81 Further, the literature discussing "tax shelters"
often includes a broader array of transactions than are specifically
covered by the relevant statutory definitions. 82 While the debate
may be broader than the scope of the statutory provisions that
apply to tax shelters and reportable transactions, classification of
a transaction as a "tax shelter" could dramatically affect the
taxpayer and the tax adviser. There is even a special office in the
IRS (the "Office of Tax Shelter Analysis") that "collects and
analyzes information about abusive tax shelters and transactions,
and coordinates LB&I's [Large Business & International] tax
shelter planning and operation. . . [in order to] tak[e] steps to
combat abusive tax shelters and transactions." 83
As to "tax expenditures," the classification of a provision as
such does not trigger any particular statutory rules, but the
classification remains critically important. 84 If a tax provision is a
"tax expenditure," it is included in the Congressional Budget
Office and Joint Committee on Taxation discussions and estimates
of tax expenditures that members of Congress can use to better
"understand the actual size of government, the uses to which
government resources are put, and the tax and economic policy
consequences that follow from the implicit or explicit choices made
in fashioning legislation."8 5 That is, tax expenditures become, at
least to some degree, subject to the "application of regular
government budgetary analysis and scrutiny." 86

80.
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(c)(2).
81.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111, 6662A, 6707.
82.
See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215,
232 (2002) (discussing as "tax shelters" transactions that might "be viewed as omissions
from the tax base" and not technically fit into the Code's definition of tax shelter or
reportable transaction); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 76, at 4-33 (discussing
several tax provisions and judicial doctrines that are relevant to "tax shelters" as this
concept is understood broadly).
83.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS AND TRANSACTIONS (2017),

https://www.irs.govfbusinesses/corporations/abusive-tax-shelters-and-transactions
[https://perma.c/MSY5-6R4H].
84.
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 77, at 973-74 ("[M]uch rides on such differences
in deffinition: If a particular deduction or credit falls within the bounds of the normative tax
base, none of the consequences of being a tax expenditure applies, while if it falls outside of
the normative tax base, all of the consequences apply.").
85.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 77, at 1; see also, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL

INCOME TAX SYSTEM (May 2013).
86.
Weisbach & Nussim, supranote 77, at 974 n.49.
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In contrast, the classification of a tax benefit as a "tax
loophole" has no similar statutory, regulatory, or policy import. No
penalties, reporting obligations, ethical rules, budgetary analyses
or other substantive impact arises from classifying a tax
preference as a "tax loophole." Fights about whether something is
or is not a "tax loophole" are pure rhetoric-classification in an
effort to frame the discussion a particular way. There seems to be
no objective truth of the matter. Even if there is, commentators
cannot agree on what it is, and it lacks material consequence. To
the extent the term "loophole" has meaning, it is primarily
subjective, with the meaning coming from the speaker's reasons
for labeling something as a "tax loophole."
Thus, spending more effort trying to define "tax loophole" is
pointless. Doing so wastes energy on a definitional question with
no consequences. If we stop trying to apply the "loophole" label to
certain preferences, we could stop debating whether or not the
classification as a "loophole" is appropriate. All of that time and
effort could be used more productively by focusing on the
underlying merits of why a speaker seeks to categorize any
particular tax preference as a "loophole."
The "loophole" rhetoric must be refrained. Forty-five years
ago, Professor Boris Bittker argued something similar in the only
other article that directly confronts the definition of "loophole" and
its use in political rhetoric.87 He sought to "rescue the federal
income tax from the superheated rhetoric of its populist friends,"
referring largely to the use of term "loopholes."88 Yet, given the
frequent use of the term "tax loophole" in today's tax reform
discourse, policymakers and commentators clearly failed to heed
his warning.
So why might this Article make more of a difference?
Professor Bittker took a definitional approach to his inquiry.
His article discussed different ways in which people conceived of
loopholes-as "statutory ambiguities and omissions," as "tax
avoidance tactics," as "erosion, preferences, and other
euphemisms"-and carefully considered whether the term
"loophole" is appropriately applied to each of these categories.
In contrast, this Article eschews the definitional approach
because what matters is not the aptness of the "loophole" label.
What matters is the reason a speaker has chosen to affix the
"loophole" label. Thus, rather than doing what Professor Bittker
did and trying to improve the use of the label by providing a better,
more thoughtful description of "tax loopholes," this Article
87.
88.

Bittker, supra note 6, at 1102, 1127.
Id. at 1127.
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provides a method for translating any application of the label into
a substantive policy discussion.
Moreover, this Article's approach can be used not only to
understand individual uses of the term "tax loophole," but also to
understand the discourse in the aggregate. This provides insights
into the perspectives of groups who talk about tax loopholes. Thus,
even if the taxonomy advanced in this Article is not ultimately
utilized by speakers who condemn tax loopholes, it can be used as
a tool to review, code, and analyze what different groups of people
care about and who they blame when they talk about "tax
loopholes." Thus, regardless of whether this Article's taxonomy
impacts the discourse any more than Professor Bittker's article
forty-five years ago, the taxonomy still serves as a tool to help us
learn something about ourselves as a society.
III. A TAxONOMY FOR TRANSLATING "TAx LOOPHOLE" RHETORIC
Any reference to a "tax loophole" can be translated into a more
substantive policy discourse by asking two questions: What is the
normative policy objection? And who is responsible for the
problem?
By reframing any purported "loophole" along these two
dimensions, a speaker can explain, and a listener can understand,
what underlies the speaker's criticism of the particular provision.
Thus, this part elaborates on each dimension for understanding
the term "tax loophole." For each question, this part catalogs
common answers, which are gleaned from analyses of academic,
practitioner, and news articles, political speeches, television media
transcripts, and other materials that use the term "tax loophole."
Together, this provides a taxonomy for translating "tax loophole"
rhetoric into more substantive discourse.
One caveat is warranted before delving into the taxonomy.
The taxonomy advanced herein, with its two dimensions and
multiple categories within each dimension, arguably replaces one
labeling system (the term "tax loophole") with another labeling
system. The labeling system advanced in the taxonomy, however,
has a much stronger foundation, is more easily understood,
demands explanations for the application of the label, and is
designed to be actionable. Specifically (and as will be explained in
greater detail below), the list of potential normative policy
objections is based in vast literature about fundamental tax policy
norms, which imbues the labels used in this part of the taxonomy
with more well-established meaning. 9 And the categories for
89.

See infra notes 92, 104, 122, 141, & 144.
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assigning responsibility are all identifiable players (either
individuals or groups of individuals) that interact with the tax
system, 90 whose rights and responsibilities are reasonably welldefined, by the Constitution (for the different branches of
government relevant to the tax system), by the Internal Revenue
Code (for tax advisers and taxpayers), by the rules of ethics and
standards of practice applicable to tax advisers, or, otherwise.
These players can take action in response to critique and can be
held accountable if they do not.
Ultimately, the taxonomy's categorization system, 9 1 although
it lacks the political appeal of the "tax loophole" label, explicitly
reveals the substance and target of the speaker's critique. Thus,
the taxonomical approach can move the discourse beyond mere
name-calling and can lay a foundation for a more meaningful

discussion.
A.

Dimension #1-What is the Normative Policy Objection?

One or more specific normative policy critiques typically
underlie any use of the term "tax loophole." Occasionally, the term
may be bandied about without careful thought about the policy
concern that makes the particular tax preference worthy of
condemnation. I suspect that, more frequently, the speaker, by
affixing the "loophole" label, has concluded that a particular
preference violates one or more norms of good tax policy, but she
may let the rhetorical power of the term imply her condemnation
without elaborating about her reasons.
The taxonomy demands explicitness. Any condemnation of a
loophole should be clear about the normative policy critique. What
norm of good tax policy is (arguably) violated by the tax
preference?
There are many potential answers to this question. Speakers
use the term "loophole" to express concern about revenue
reduction, unfairness, complexity, economic inefficiency, lack of
neutrality, lack of efficacy (typically for provisions intended to

90.
C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX PoIucY 15-19 (2008) (describing
the "parts of the government [that] have some responsibility for tax policy").
91.
It is important to distinguish between (i) a feature that, if present, results in a
particular tax preference being labeled as a 'loophole" (i.e., a definition of a "loophole"), and
(ii) the identification of a feature that causes a particular provision that has already been
labeled as a "loophole" to be problematic (i.e., a taxonomical category for a loophole). The
former is a definition, the goal of which is to determine whether a particular tax preference
has the feature, and if it does, label the preference as a loophole. The latter is what this
taxonomy seeks to do, to understand why something that has already been labeled a
loophole" is troubling to the labeler. In the former, the "loophole" labeling is the end,
whereas in the latter, the "loophole" labeling is just the beginning.
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achieve a social policy goal, although sometimes speakers object to
the social policy goal itself), other concerns, and combinations of
the foregoing.
This part draws on numerous examples throughout the
academic literature and the popular/political discourse to catalog
and explain each of the above potential policy problems (and
variations thereon) that underlie different uses of the term "tax
loophole." In doing so, this part highlights questions relevant to
each category in an effort to further the particular substantive
discourse. Of course, the definition of each of these policy norms
is, itself, slippery (some more than others), and different people
will make different trade-offs among them. However, the below
demonstrates the wide range of policy concerns that people could
be expressing when labeling a tax preference as a "loophole," and
the below illustrates how very different substantive conversations
could ensue if only speakers actually named the policy norm that
they believe is violated by the "loophole."
1. Revenue Impact. A common policy concern articulated or
implied by those concerned about loopholes is loss of revenue. 92
This concern motivates, at least in part, the labeling as "loopholes"
tax benefits such as (i) deferral of taxes on foreign income,
inversions, and other cross-border planning strategies that reduce
taxes paid by, and revenue raised from, multinational
enterprises; 93 (ii) corporate deductions that allow corporations'
effective tax rates to be well below the nominal marginal rate;9 4
(iii) tax expenditures, such as the mortgage interest deduction,
that, if eliminated, would be "the biggest revenue raisers;" 95 (iV)
capital gains rate preference that, if eliminated, could raise
92.
See, e.g., Douglas, supranote 44, at 24 ("[L]oopholes ... enabled large quantities
of income to slip through the tax net."); see also generally STEUERLE, supra note 90, at 15,
19-22 (discussing "taxes as a means of financing government"); JOEL SLEMROD & JON
BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 13-16 (2008)

(discussing how taxes finance government operations).
93.
See, e.g., Jonathan D. Rockoff et al., Pfizer Walks Away From Allergan Deal, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2016, 5:26 PM), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/pfizer-walks-away-fromallergan-deal-1459939739 (inversions result in the "departure of tax receipts"); Jeff
Sommer, A Stranded $2 Trillion Overseas Stash Gets Closer to Coming Home, N.Y. TIMES,
(Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/your-money/strategies-corporate-cashrepatriation-bipartisan-consensuss.html. After the 2017 Tax Act, the specific cross-border
tax reduction strategies described as 'loopholes" will change because the rules have
changed, but commentators continue to use the 'loophole" label to describe tax reduction
opportunities for multinational enterprises available after the 2017 tax legislation. See, e.g.,
Shay, supra note 20.
See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, U.S. Business Has High Tax Rates but Pays Less,
94.
N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/business/economy/
03rates.html.
See, e.g., Shreve, supra note 44, at 305 (quoting Bill Bradley).
95.
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hundreds of billions of dollars; 96 and (v) the deferral of tax on likekind exchanges, which "cost[s] the government billions a year";97
among many other tax preferences.9 8
Calling these preferences "loophole" as an expression of
concern about foregone revenue assumes a particular baseline
from which the revenue is lost. 99 The relevant baseline depends on
the particular "loophole." For example, the above-mentioned tax
preferences are only revenue reducing when compared to the
revenue that would be collected under the following baselines: (i)
comprehensive current taxation on worldwide income (before the
2017 tax legislation) or a largely territorial business taxation
system with an unavoidable/unmanipulable transition rule and
fully effective anti-abuse rules (after the 2017 tax legislation); (ii)
full corporate income taxation at the stated marginal rates; (iii)
the "normal tax" as that concept is used in the tax expenditure
analysis; (iv) taxation of all income at ordinary rates; and (v) full
current taxation on all dispositions, respectively.
Thus, when concern about revenue is the policy objection, we
must ask what the speaker's baseline is for determining that there
is revenue loss, and we should ask why that baseline is the right
one from which to judge the provision. Returning to the first
example (regarding U.S. multinational corporations), someone
who supported a territorial rather than a worldwide tax system
before the 2017 tax legislation 0 0 might have objected to the
"loophole" characterization of inversions and other tax planning
efforts that reduce the U.S. tax owed on income earned abroad.
Such efforts might not have been particularly objectionable to such
a person; rather, they might have constituted self-help to mitigate
the impact of an overbroad tax system. 10 1 Thus, inquiring about
the relevant baseline for "loopholes" criticized as revenue-reducing
96.
See, e.g., Kwak, supranote 51 (arguing that "[i]f you really want to raise revenues,
the Holy Grail .... [is] taxing investment income like ordinary income" and citing an
estimate of $440 billion raised over five years).
97.
See, e.g., Marr, supra note 52.
98.
See, e.g., Tom McGee, U.S. Sales Tax: An Unfair Arbiter of Winners, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 16, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sales-tax-an-unfair-arbiter-ofwinners-1471370436 (lamenting the revenue lost due to the lack of sales taxes on online
retail sales, which the author calls a "loophole").
99.
See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 77, at 21 (describing the relevant
baseline for measuring the magnitude of tax expenditures).
100.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 115-409, at 370 (2017) (explaining the House bill's
provisions that would move the U.S. from a worldwide taxation system to a largely
territorial system in order to improve the global competitiveness of U.S. businesses).
101.
Cf., CNN RADIO, The Language of the Loophole (Nov. 23, 2012),
http://cnnradio.cnn.com/2012/11/23/the-language-of-the-loophole/ (Libby Lewis paraphrasing
George Lakoff, saying, "conservatives, in general, see tax loopholes as a good thing, because
for people who think taxes are bad, then something that lets you avoid taxes is good").
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turns a debate about whether inversions are properly labeled
"loopholes" into a debate about the design of the U.S. international
tax system, which, while still complicated and challenging, is more
substantive.
Sometimes the revenue concern about "loopholes" is
expressed not on an aggregate basis (i.e., for the fisc), but rather
on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer basis, where a tax preference enables
an individual taxpayer to reduce its taxes (and thus reduce the
revenue collected from it).102 Whether the revenue concern is
raised from a macro (aggregate revenue reduction) or micro
(individual taxpayer tax reduction) perspective, baseline questions
remain-against what baseline is the taxpayer's tax burden being
compared? And why is that the right baseline?
The conversation spurred by these questions can continue
with follow-up questions such as: Are there countervailing policy
considerations that might outweigh this revenue loss? What would
be done with additional revenue collected if the purported
"loophole" were closed? 103 And how much revenue does the
government need (i.e., what is the appropriate size/function of
government)?
2. Fairness. Fairness is also a common concern explicitly or
implicitly raised by references to "tax loopholes." Fairness, of
course, is an elusive concept that can be challenging to define, and
this difficulty spawned a large amount of literature. 104 Thus, not
surprisingly, when the term "loophole" is used to imply a fairness
critique of a particular tax benefit, speakers mean a variety of
different things.
Speakers may mean that the benefit is available to some
taxpayers and not others.1 05 Or, more particularly, they may mean

See, e.g., Liz Moyer, Treasury Plans Additional Rules to Deter Inversions, N.Y.
102.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/business/dealbook/treasury("A takeover [that takes
plans-additional-rules-to-deter-inversions.html?mcubz=3
advantage of a loophole] could allow Pfizer to cut its 25 percent tax rate by moving its
headquarters to Europe.").
See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
103.
See, e.g., C. Eugene Steuerle, And Equal (Tax) Justice for All?, in TAX JUSTICE:
104.
THE ONGOING DEBATE (Joseph Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., eds.) (2002) (discussing
different concepts of tax equity); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supranote 92, at 57-98; Louis Kaplow,
Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989); Paul A.
McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow
Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairnessor Unfairness?
A Considerationof the PhilosophicalBases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J.
OF TAX POL'Y 221 (1995).
See, e.g., Bill Bradley, Tax Reform is a Team Sport, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
105.
(Apr. 7, 2011, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-07/bill-bradleytax-reform-is-a-team-sport (loopholes "reduce taxes for their lucky beneficiaries but leave
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fairness in the traditional horizontal equity sense-that the
benefit is available to some taxpayers and not to other similarly
situated taxpayers.10 6 Sometimes the fairness concern is less about
similar taxpayers and more about a particularset of taxpayers
who benefit from the preference as compared to all other taxpayers
who do not share that benefit. For example, the rich benefit from
a preference but the middle/lower classes do not, as with step-up
basis upon death and the capital gains preference;10 7 corporations,
businesses, or large multinational enterprises benefit from the
preference but individuals do not, as with the (pre-2017 Tax Act)
ability to reduce taxable income through inversions;1 08 certain
"favored" businesses benefit but other businesses do not, as with
the limited application of sales taxes to online purchases, which
some argue favors online merchants over brick-and-mortar
merchants,109 and as with the new deduction for qualified business
income,1 10 which is available to businesses that provide "favored"
services but disallowed to other businesses;11 1 special interests
(such as the real estate industry, 112 the fund and finance

the rest of us paying more").
106.
See, e.g., Joseph J. Thorndike, Tax History: Stanley Surrey Knew a Thing or Two
about Loopholes, 138 TAX NOTES 663 (2013) (discussing provisions that violated Stanley
Surrey's test for identifying undesirable special tax provisions: "They all violated canons of
horizontal equity, or what Surrey called simply fairness. The income-tax burden should as
far as possible apply equally to persons with the same dollar income."'); Douglas, supra note
44, at 304 (positing a similar test).
107.
These provisions technically apply to all taxpayers, but they have been critiqued
as loopholes on the grounds that the rich get the vast majority of the benefit. See, e.g.,
BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 98 n.15 (1999) (citing

Section 1014 as an example a "loophole that benefit[s] the wealthy."); Kwak, supranote 51
(calling the capital gains preference a loophole for the wealthy).
108.
See, e.g., Liz Moyer, Pfizer andAllergan Deal Comes with an Extensive Prenup, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/business/dealbook/pfizer-andallergan-deal-comes-with-an-extensive-prenup.html
(quoting Senator Franken as saying,
"[i]nversions are a terrible deal for the American taxpayer . . .. Large companies use loopholes
to get around paying their fair share of taxes, which is something middle-class Americans cannot
do"); Hillary Clinton'sPfizer Follies, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2015, 4:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/hillary-clintons-pfizer-follies-1448575026 (loopholes "disadvantage small businesses
and domestic firms that cannot game the international tax system").
109.
See, e.g., McGee, supra note 98.
110.
2017 Tax Act § 11011(a) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 199A).
111.
See Avi-Yonah et al., supranote 19, at 8-9.
112.
See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Tax Cuts for Americans Like Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/business/economy/if-trump-gets-hisway-real-estate-will-get-even-more-tax-breaks.html ("[there are] major loopholes in the
existing tax code that treat real estate developers as a special privileged class"); Paul
Sullivan, How the Tax Code Rewrite Favors Real Estate Over Art, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20 18/01/12/your-money/taxes-real-estate.html (arguing
that it is unfair that the 2017 Tax Act preserves the like-kind "exchange loophole" for real
estate investors but not art investors).
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industries, 113 or the oil industry) 114 benefit from the preference but
other industries do not; 115 or people with good lawyers benefit from
the preference but others do not, as with sophisticated estate
planning strategies.1 16 And sometimes, the fairness critique
reflects a combination of these slightly different meanings.
Although the fairness critiques of "tax loopholes" vary, each
asserts that some group is benefitting while another group is not,
and each implies that it is inappropriate for the tax law to favor
the former over the latter. Thus, in order to flesh out the speaker's
fairness critique more clearly, when the critique implied by the
"loophole" label is about fairness, we should ask the speaker to be
clear about the groups of taxpayers she is comparing-who is
benefiting and who is not-and we should ask why the speaker
believes that the difference in treatment is not appropriate.
A different version of a fairness critique implied by the term
"loophole" focuses on situations where two groups of taxpayers are
being treated alike and the speaker believes they should be treated
differently.11 7 This version of the fairness critique is somewhat less
common in the "loophole" discourse, but speakers sometimes
assert that some group of taxpayers who were not intended to
benefit from (or should not benefit from) a tax preference are,
somehow, legally benefitting along with the appropriate
beneficiaries.1 1 8 For example, some argue that it is unfair that

)

113.
See, e.g., Alan J. Patricof, Close My Tax Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/20l6/08/27/opinion/close-my-tax-loophole.html?mcubz=1
(arguing that the "carried interest loophole" contributes to a "political and cultural
environment [that] is marred by a toxic belief ... that the world of high finance unjustly
supersedes [ordinary Americans'] rights, needs and wants"); 2016 Democratic Party
Platform, at 13 (July 21, 2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulpapers-pdf/117717.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EL7H-FC98] ("[W]e will shut down the "private tax system" for those at the
top, immediately close egregious loopholes like those enjoyed by hedge fund managers ...
114.
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President (Feb. 15,
2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/15/press-conferencepresident ("[W]e shouldn't provide special treatment to the oil industry when they've been
making huge profits and can afford to further invest in their companies without special tax
breaks that are different from what somebody else gets.").
115.
See, e.g., Joseph J. Thorndike, 175 Years of Tax Planks and Party Platforms:
Democratic Edition, 151 TAx NOTES 1754 (2016) (discussing "benefits and loopholes
[preserved by special interests] 'at the expense of the average taxpayers"').
116.
America's Royals Exploit Tax Loopholes, MSNBC (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://on.msnbc.com1cSzFe3 (calling an estate planning strategy "a whopping, shocking,
loophole" that ... was "first discovered and exploited" by an "enterprising lawyer"); Jay A.
Soled & Mitchell Gans, Sales to GrantorTrusts:A Case Study of What the IRS and Congress
Can Do to Curb Aggressive Transfer Tax Techniques, 78 TENN. L. REV. 973, 1012 (2011) (the
"wealthiest slice of taxpayers ... have ample resources to secure professional advice and to
devise ways to minimize their transfer tax burdens").
117.
That is, there is a vertical equity problem. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note
104, at 608.
118.
See, e.g., William Hoffman, Black Liquor: The Loophole that Won't Quit, 143 TAX
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SUV owners are benefiting from depreciation deductions that were
not intended for them,11 9 and some argued that it was unfair that
taxpayers who were in the U.S. illegally were benefiting from the
child care tax credit when that credit should not apply to them. 120
In these contexts, the speaker should again be clear about the
comparison groups (i.e., among those who benefit, who should and
who should not), and the speaker should be able to articulate why
only one of the two groups should be eligible for the tax preference.
The foregoing merely reflects an application of the literature
about the meaning of fairness to the "loophole" discourse. 121 This
application, however, offers a structure for inquiring about why
someone has labeled a particular tax preference as an unfair
"loophole"-identification of fairness as the primary policy concern
and specification about the speaker's perspective about which
taxpayers are and ought (or ought not) to be favored (and why).
This structure advances the substantive policy conversation,
which may ultimately broaden to include more fundamental
questions about the discussants' perspectives about the
appropriate degree of progressivity in the tax system and about
income/wealth inequality.
3. Neutrality, Efficiency, & the Economy. Sometimes the
primary critique implied by the "tax loophole" label is about
neutrality and efficiency.1 2 2 That is, the problem with the existence
of a particular tax benefit is that it distorts behavior because
taxpayers
seeking to
reduce
taxes will alter
their
economic/business decisions in order to obtain that benefit,
resulting in inefficiency.1 2 3 Commentators argue, for example, that
NOTES 18 (Apr. 7, 2014) (criticizing the availability of an alternative fuels tax credit for a
context that was not intended by Congress).
119.
See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 28, at 470-77; Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again:
How Tax Policy Drives TransportationChoice, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 640 (2005).
120.
See, e.g., Bill Set Forth to Close $4B Tax Loophole, Fox NEWS (May 24, 2012),
http://video.foxnews.com/v/1655287701001/bill-set-forth-to-close-4b-taxloophole/#sp=showclips. The 2017 Tax Act responded to this critique by modifying the child tax credit so that
it is only available for a child with a social security number, which would prevent taxpayers
from claiming the child tax credit for children who are in the U.S. illegally. 2017 Tax Act
§ 11022 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 24(h)(7)).
121.
See supra note 104.
122.
See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 92, at 131-34 (defining neutrality as a
concern); STEUERLE, supra note 90, at 12-13 (defining efficiency as a concern); LOUIS
KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 53-150 (2008).

123.
See Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is
Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 249 (2007); see also, e.g., Sunday Morning Futures, (Fox
television broadcast Jan. 17, 2016) ("[Y]ou don't want [rich and productive workers] always
spending their time trying to find loopholes.. . . [a better plan] keep[s] the tax arbitrage[r]s
from spending all their time [ I trying to get around tax."); Hillary Clinton's Pfizer Follies,
supra note 108 (loopholes that encourage multinational enterprises to keep money offshore
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"[e]very tax loophole, every deduction is a barnacle that slows
down economic efficiency." 124 Absent the "holes" in the tax law
through which a taxpayer might try to fit herself, she would just
proceed directly toward her economic goals rather than contort her
behavior. 125 On the other hand, sometimes the behavioral change
is exactly what is intended. That is, the tax preference is intended
to distort behavior in a desirable way, increasing the economic
return to an action that produces positive externalities and
thereby leading to a more (not less) efficient allocation of
resources. 126
A related critique implied by the use of the term "loophole" is
that a particular tax benefit is bad for the economy. 127 This can be
because the provision "doesn't perform an economically useful
function," 128 because the provision's revenue loss exceeds the
societal benefit of the tax preference, or most commonly, because
the preference leads to a misallocation of resources that will
reduce overall economic and job growth in the U.S. in the long
run. 129 Indeed, commentators often argue that eliminating
loopholes is a critical part of spurring economic growth; 130 for
example, Republicans repeatedly made this argument as part of

"distort[s] incentives for investment").
124.
Fox News: Special Report with Bret Baier (Fox television broadcast Apr. 18, 2016),
https://grabien.com/file.php?id=88252 [https://perma.cc/TX2U-GHHB].
125.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Chamber of
Commerce (Feb. 7, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/
07/remarks-president-chamber-commerce (because of "loopholes and carve-outs," "you've
got too many companies ending up making decisions based on what their tax director says
instead of what their engineer designs or what their factories produce").
126.
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supranote 92, at 133.
See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, CarriedInterest Tax Break Divides Again After Trump
127.
Revives the Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/
business/carried-interest-tax-break-divides-again-after-trump-revives-the-issue.html
(articulating a debate about whether the tax treatment of carried interest facilitates
entrepreneurial risk-taking, which benefits the economy, with President Obama arguing
that "this tax loophole ... is not in any demonstrable way improving our economy").
128.
Meg Shreve, Conversations:Sen. Carl Levin, 144 TAX NOTES 765, 767 (2014).
129.
See, e.g., From Hillary Clinton's Promises to Policies, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/opinionl/from-hillary-clintons-promises-to-policies.html
(implying that a "loophole" encourages multinational businesses to keep money offshore,
inhibiting "timely investment of available funds [in the U.S. economy]"); Matt
Flegenheimer & Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton Makes Dire Predictions for Economy if
Donald Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/
us/politics/hillary-clinton-speech-economy.html (loopholes "encourage companies to move
jobs overseas").
130.
See, e.g., Rand Paul, Blow Up the Tax Code and Start Over, WALL ST. J. (June 18,
2015, 7:09 PM), https1/www.wsj.com/articles/blow-up-the-tax-code-and-start-over-1434582592
(arguing that eliminating loopholes and lowering the tax rate would be "an economic steroid
injection . . . . [that] the Tax Foundation estimates that in 10 years it will increase gross
domestic product by about 10%, and create at least 1.4 million new jobs.").
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the push for tax reform in 2017.131 On the other hand, purported
loopholes are sometimes defended on economic grounds, with
arguments that the tax preference is critical to economic
prosperity, 132 supports the growth of small businesses, 133 and/or
enables U.S. businesses to survive, 134 particularly in the global
marketplace. 1 3 5
Sometimes the argument connecting the loophole and the
economy depends on what other actions would be made possible
by closing the loophole. For example, Senator Bernie Sanders
argued that revenue generated from closing international tax
planning loopholes could be used "to rebuild our infrastructure
and create up to 13 million jobs" 136 and President Obama argued
that closing loopholes would enable us to "invest[] in things like
education and job creation and job training that we know grow the
economy for everybody." 137 In contrast, for example, some argue
that closing international tax planning loopholes could enable us
to lower U.S. corporate tax rates, 138 which would encourage
corporations to "bring that money back here [ ..... which would]
explode the economy because there's trillions of dollars sitting on
the sideline because the [current tax] environment is not one that
is conducive to investment." 1 3 9 Similarly, during the recent tax
See, e.g., Committee on Ways and Means, Unified Framework for Fixing Our
131.
Broken Tax Code 3 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://waysandmeansforms.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
taxframework.pdf [https://perma.cc/443N-UDTZ]; H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 188, 190, 191,
296 (2017) (justifying several proposed tax law changes as "part of [the] larger effort toward
tax reform which broadens the tax base, closes loopholes, and grows the economy.").
See, e.g., A Stealth Death Tax Increase, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2016, 6:46 PM),
132.
that
(arguing
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-stealth-death-tax-increase-1473115618
closing a purported estate planning loophole creates "economic destruction" and results in
a "less prosperous society").
133.
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks in Canton, Ohio (Oct. 22, 2004),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041022- 12.html
(arguing that what Senator Kerry characterized as loopholes are actually tax benefits that
help small businesses).
See, e.g., HillaryClinton'sPfizer Follies, supra note 108 ("[f not for the loopholes,
134.
many companies couldn't bear to pay the federal corporate income tax rate of 35%, which
is the highest in the developed world.").
President Barack Obama, Remarks and a Discussion with the Business
135.
Roundtable (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=85849
[https://perma.cc/95AE-QY87] ("IBM CEO Palmisano arguing that purported loopholes
"help American competitiveness').
136.
Democratic Candidates Debate in Durham, New Hampshire (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=111471 [https1/perma.cdMQK6-W7KQ].
137.
President Barack Obama, Remarks on Tax Code Reform and an Exchange with
Reporters (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=117088 [https://perma.cc/
3HB3-9FKJI.
138.
Amanda M. Grossman & Steven D. Grossman, Closing Tax Loopholes or Lowering
the Tax Rate, 147 TAx NOTES 1195, 1195 (June 8, 2015) (discussing this commonly posited
trade-off).
Fox News (Fox television broadcast Feb. 29, 2016); see also, e.g., Paul, supra note 130.
139.
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reform push, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan argued, more
generally, that "closing loopholes .. .. allows you to lower tax rates,"
which will result in "stronger economic growth" and "a healthier
economy." 140
As with most major tax policy questions, there are serious
debates about what tax provisions, tax base, and tax rates
currently hinder economic growth and about what changes would
most effectively increase growth.1 41 Thus, to the extent the term
"loophole" is used to critique a tax preference as distortionary,
economically inefficient, and/or anti-growth, the speaker should be
clear about exactly how the tax preference distorts behavior, why
that distortion is problematic, how the speaker proposes to change
the tax preference, and why that change (coupled with what other
actions) would improve economic growth. And this discussion
should consider issues of incidence and the dynamic impacts of
potential changes on efficiency, behavioral responses and
growth.1 42
4. Complexity. One additional, albeit slightly less common,
critique implied by the use of the term "loophole" is about needless
complexity,1 43 which makes it harder for the government to enforce
the law and for taxpayers to comply with the law.1 44 The concern
is that, with loopholes, the government ends up wasting resources
to enforce the nuances of the tax preference or is unable to enforce
the rules effectively due to lack of resources, 4 5 and the taxpayers
incur time, legal fees, and transaction costs in order to obtain the
tax benefit, and may not ultimately apply the law correctly.1 46
Press Release, Rep. Paul Ryan, A Stronger Economy, a Healthier Middle Class
140.
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://paulryan.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=398763
[https://perma.cc/RLU2-TBWN].
See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 92, at 112-57 (summarizing the
141.
discourse about the relationship between taxes and economic growth); STEUERLE, supra
note 90, at 22-25 (describing "taxes as an instrument of economic policy").
For example, who really benefits from purported growth-enhancing efforts to
142.
close corporate tax loopholes?
President Barack Obama, 2014 State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014),
143.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barackobamas-state-union-address ("[O]ur Tax Code is riddled with wasteful, complicated
loopholes."); Hillary Clinton's Pfizer Follies, supra note 108 (adding loopholes is how
legislators "built a monstrously complicated tax code").
See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 92, at 159-88 (discussing simplicity as a
144.
policy norm and its connection to compliance and enforcement); STEUERLE, supra note 90,
at 14-15.
See, e.g., Omri Y. Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform
145.
Discourse in the United States, 32 VA. TAX. REV. 133 (2012) (discussing an argument that,
because of "loopholes and preferences," "the corporate tax system is far too complex,
making ... administration inefficient").
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks Accepting the Presidential
146.
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As with prior categories of normative policy objections to
"loopholes," the concern can be fleshed out through specificity about
the objection. If complexity is the critique implied by the "loophole"
label, the speaker should explain why the particular preference
adds complexity, why that complexity is not justified by other
benefits of the preference, what adverse (compliance/enforcement)
consequences arise from the complexity, and how a change would
simplify the code and thus reduce those adverse consequences.
5. Social Policy Objection. Another (but less common)
critique implied by the use of the term "loophole" is an objection to
the social policy objective of the particular tax benefit or an
objection to the way in which that social policy goal is achieved
through the Code.
For example, commentators who decry green energy tax
subsidies as "loopholes" generally object to some aspect of the
underlying environmental policy. 147 This may be because they do
not support governmental investment in green energy either
directly or indirectly (e.g., through encouragement/subsidization
of private investment in green energy); 148 some because they
and
efficiency
the
undermine
that
subsidies
believe
cost-effectiveness of the industry and its products. 149 Or some
critics of green energy "loopholes" may support governmental
investment in green energy but may not believe that the tax code
Nomination (Sept. 2, 2004), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=72727
[https:/perma.ccDA94-GHM5] ("[T]he current tax code, which is a complicated mess, filled
with special interest loopholes, saddling our people with more than 6 billion hours of
paperwork and headache every year."); The Better GOP Agenda, WALL ST. J. (July 4, 2016,
6:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-better-gop-agenda-1467672372 (discussing a
reform proposal that "would eliminate so many other credits and loopholes that ... most
taxpayers could fill out their annual returns on a 14-line postcard. This simplicity adds to
the political appeal of reform.").
See, e.g., Jack Lew's Flee America Plan, WALL ST. J. (July, 17, 2014, 3:16 PM),
147.
(referring
to
https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-lews-flee-america-plan-1405553160
"companies [that] are able to exploit loopholes (especially green-energy subsidies)'); The
Next Tax Increase, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2013, at A16 (criticizing President Obama for
proposing "tens of billions of dollars worth of additional 'corporate loopholes,' including for
his billionaire buddies in the green-energy business"); Republican Candidates Debate in
Tampa, Florida (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=96683
[https://perma.cc/S6YD-98EZ] (Newt Gingrich saying, "And I thought to myself, doesn't
[Obama] realize that every green tax credit is a loophole?").
148.
See, e.g., Nicolas Loris, EFEPA Eliminates Corporate Welfare and Corporate
Dependence, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/
environment/reportefepa-eliminates-corporate-welfare-and-corporate-dependence
[https://perma.cc/6GKW-4SQ6] ("[G]overnment policies intervening in the economy [of the
energy sector] should be removed . . . . [in order to] allow for a more market-based energy
economy that benefits economically viable producers and, ultimately, consumers with
reliable, affordable energy.").
See Patrick Jenevein, Wind-Power Subsidies? No Thanks., WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2013),
149.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323501004578386501479255158
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is the right way to encourage investment in green energy, or they
may believe that imposing higher taxes on disfavored (non-green)
energy sources would more efficiently encourage investment in
green energy (i.e., as opposed to providing tax breaks for green
energy).15 0 And yet others may believe that tax benefits, in theory,
should be used to encourage the use of green energy but that the
existing tax benefits for green energy are ineffective (i.e., failing to
spur desired investments) or poorly designed (allowing
unintended beneficiaries to take advantage of the benefit). 15 1
This type of social policy critique is often just a subset of one
(or more) of the earlier policy concerns (e.g., that the preference
results in the loss of too much revenue, is unfair because it favors
one set of taxpayers over another set that should be treated
equally, or distorts behavior in a way that is inefficient). However,
it is worth mentioning this category explicitly because many tax
preferences are driven by some social policy goal. 152
6. Conclusion about Dimension #1 (Policy Concern). Other
normative policy objections, beyond those listed above, might
motivate concerns about "loopholes," and often, the use of the term
"loophole" reflects multiple policy concerns. 153 Indeed, one
commentator remarked that "[e]gregious tax loopholes add
complexity, create inefficiency and destroy fairness all at once."1 54
The taxonomy can accommodate this. If a speaker objects to a
purported "loophole" on more than one normative policy ground or
on a policy basis not listed above, she need only name the multiple
(or other) policy concerns. The taxonomy works as long as the
speaker is explicit about the policy concern(s).
Explicitly identifying the normative policy objection(s) that
motivates the criticism of a particular "loophole" reduces the
rhetorical power of the "loophole" label. This dimension of the
See generally MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH
150.
SERV., R43206, ENERGY TAX POLICY: ISSUES IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 5, 24 (June 15, 2016)

(providing some support for this approach).
151.
See, e.g., Hoffman, supranote 118 (regarding the alternative fuels tax credit).
152.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21 (2017) (allowing the dependent care services credit); I.R.C. § 24
(2017) (allowing the child tax credit); I.R.C. § 25A (2017) (allowing educational tax credits);
I.R.C. § 32 (2017) (allowing the earned income tax credit); I.R.C. § 170 (2017) (allowing the
charitable deduction);.I.R.C. § 213 (2017) (allowing the medical expense deduction).
See, e.g., Hillary Clinton's Pfizer Follies, supra note 108 (raising revenue,
153.
economic/neutrality, fairness, and complexity concerns); David Leonhardt, The Big
18,
2016),
TIMES
(Oct.
Taxes,
N.Y.
That
Avoid
Companies
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/opinion/the-big-companies-that-avoid-taxes.html
(raising fairness and economic/neutrality concerns).
154.
Alan S. Blinder, A FairnessAgenda for Winning Over Angry Voters, WALL ST. J.,
(Oct. 2, 2015, 6:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-fairness-agenda-for-winning-overangry-voters-1443739670.
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taxonomy reveals information about the underlying policy
concerns that the "loophole" label conceals, and this dimension of
the taxonomy stimulates thought about the normative merits of a
tax preference that the "loophole" label inhibits. 15 5 And it replaces
(at least to some degree) the "loophole" label's appeals to emotion
with appeals to logic and analysis.1 5 6 As a result of the foregoing,
this dimension of the taxonomy can counteract illusions of
consensus by revealing the details of the relevant policy concerns,
thereby allowing listeners to individually assess the degree to
which they agree or disagree with the speaker's characterization
of and concerns about the purported loophole. 157
B. Dimension #2 - Who is Responsible?
Often, the use of the term "tax loophole" also casts blame on
someone in particular, either faulting that party for the existence
of the "loophole" or condemning that party for using or facilitating
the use of the "loophole." The blameworthy party differs depending
on the context, with responsible parties including both
governmental actors (Congress, the President, the Treasury, the
IRS, or courts) and private parties (taxpayers, their lobbyists, or
tax advisors).
By identifying the party who is being blamed for the problem
of the "loophole," we can better understand what critique the
speaker is making and what remedy the speaker is seeking. Thus,
this dimension of the taxonomy asks: who is to blame for the "tax
loophole"?
The question of who the speaker believes is responsible for the
existence of, and normative tax policy problems created by, the
loophole is admittedly slightly different from the question of which
party should take action in response. Indeed, the party that caused
the alleged problem may not be the party that is in the best
position to fix it. However, the second dimension of the taxonomy
focuses on the identification of the party criticized for the creation,
perpetuation, or exploitation of loophole. This is because the
"loophole" discourse that criticizes a specific party focuses more on
causation than on response. Moreover, the question of which party
should respond (and how) is incorporated into the taxonomy as a

155.
Cf. CORCORAN, supranote 11, at xv (explaining that political rhetoric is used "not
to stimulate thought, but to prevent it; not to convey information, but to conceal or distort it").
156.
Cf. Reisigl, supra note 11, at 97-98 (describing different persuasive strategies of
political rhetoric, including appeals to emotion (pathos)).
157.
Cf. Strickland, supra note 11, at 339 (describing the rhetorical strategy of
"obfuscation" in which "the putative motive is to avoid hard decision and to create the
illusion of consensus').
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follow-up question for discussion after the party that created the
problem has been identified.
This part again draws on numerous examples throughout the
academic literature and the popular/political discourse, this time
in order to catalog and discuss common targets of the critique
made by speakers who use of the term "tax loophole." Congress
and the taxpayers themselves are the two most common targets of
criticism, but this part first discusses all governmental parties
that are criticized for the problem of loopholes and then turns to
the private parties.
1. The Legislative Branch. Congress (or, at the state level,
the state legislature) is one of the primary targets of speakers who
decry loopholes in the tax code, but the critiques vary.
Some critiques condemn Congress for creating loopholes,15 8
while others condemn Congress for failing to close loopholes. 15 9
Either way, speakers generally expect Congress to close the
loophole once it has been identified.160
When criticizing Congress for the creation and perpetuation
of loopholes, some critics fault the people, either individual
members of Congress or Congress as a whole, while others fault
the lawmaking and political process. Although there is some
overlap, this distinction can affect both the specific action needed
to close the loophole and the likelihood that that action will be
taken and will be successful.
Criticisms of the people sometimes condemn Congress (and
members thereof) for being incompetent, suggesting that Congress
does a bad job of drafting the laws because of "drafting
ineptitudes" or otherwise. 161 A related critique condemns Congress
for exercising bad judgment when intentionally creating (or failing
to fix) a loophole. For example, candidates for political office who
served in Congress are commonly criticized for their failure to
158.
See, e.g., Hillary Clinton'sPfizerFollies, supra note 108 (faulting Democrats, with
some help from Republicans, for creating a "monstrously complicated tax code" by adding
all sorts of special loopholes); Wyden, supra note 66 (blaming Republicans for creating
"huge new loopholes").
159.
See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Trump Lands a Blow Against CarriedInterest Tax
Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/business/withtrump-as-foe-carried-interest-tax-loophole-is-vulnerable.html (blaming Congress for not
taking action on the "carried interest loophole" despite efforts by President Obama);
Matthew Goldstein & Tiffany Hsu, 2 Provisions of Tax Bill Could Have Little Impact, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2017, at A12 (faulting the authors of both the House and Senate tax bills
for failure to close the "carried interest loophole").
160.
See, e.g., SENATE FINANCE COMMITIEE, supra note 38 ("A loophole is something that
Congress ... would generally shut down, at least going forward, once it learned ofthe loophole.").
161.
Bittker, supra note 6, at 1107; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text
(discussing various types of drafting problems that create loopholes).
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close loopholes as part of an argument that these candidates do
not deserve (re)election. 16 2 In particular, political candidates that
speak out against a "loophole" may be criticized as hypocrites for
supporting the loophole while previously in office. 163 These
remarks get quite personal and can reflect a high degree of moral
condemnation, 1 64 implying that Congress (either as a group or as
individuals) is corrupt 16 5-having sold out to the special interests
and misusing their position of trust-or is otherwise lacking in
character. 166 Representative comments include assertions that (a)
"[w]hen giant companies wanted more tax loopholes, Washington
got it done" 167 and (b) "small businesses have been chosen to bear
this burden [(the high dollar cost of closing particular loopholes)]
because they haven't purchased influence from the Clinton
financial empire." 168 The loophole discourse condemning lobbyists,
discussed in Part III.B.4, reinforces the narrative that legislators
can be swayed into creating or preserving loopholes by influence
peddlers.
On the other hand, some are less offended by members of
Congress and suggest that "loopholes," although created and

162.
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Economy in
Parma,
Ohio
(Sept.
8,
2010),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/09/08/remarks-president-economy-parma-ohio (using the support of loopholes to
attack Congressman Boehner).
163.
See, e.g., Barack Obama, Remarks in Janesville, Wisconsin: "Keeping America's
Promise" (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulwslindex.php?pid=77032
[https://perma.cc/9U56-53J7] ("Before she started running for President [and came out
against a particular loophole], Senator Clinton actually voted for [the] loophole.").
164.
See, e.g., Jeff Sommer, A Tax-Cutting Move That Pfizer Can Hardly Resist, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/your-money/a-tax-cuttingmove-that-pfizer-can-hardly-resist.html (lamenting Congress's failure to close loopholes for
U.S. multinational corporations and quoting Professor Edward Kleinbard as saying,
"[t]here is a moral imperative here [that] falls on the shoulders of Congress").
165.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, PassingThrough to Corruption,N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/opinion/republicans-taKes-corruption.html (suggesting
that Senator Bob Corker may have changed his vote (to "yes") on the tax bill because of the
addition of a "loophole" for real-estate businesses that would benefit him personally).
See Mangu-Ward, supra note 64 ("Special tax treatment [provided via loopholes]
166.
is a crucial way for [politicians] to maintain, and disguise, their power . . .. [L]oopholes are
the most underrated locus of political power. Politicians use the tax code to reward their
friends, punish their enemies and cut deals with their colleagues.") But see Surrey, supra
note 8, at 1155-56 (offering less dystopian explanations for Congress's actions, including
"The Congressman's Desire To Be Helpful").
167.
CNN Live Event/Special (CNN television broadcast Jul. 25, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1607/25/se.02.html.
168.
Mary Wertheim, Letter to the Editor, Clinton's College Fix is Expensive and
Flawed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2016, at A12; see also, e.g., Senator John Edwards, The Moral
Test of Our Generation, Remarks at St. Anselm's College in Manchester, New Hampshire
(Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=77247 [https://perma.cc/MXY8FB6V] ("Max loopholes ... are not going to be closed, all because Democrats-our partywanted their campaign money.").
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retained by Congress, reflect flaws in our lawmaking and political
process. That is, loopholes are an unavoidable and understandable
product of imperfect humans working in an imperfect lawmaking
system. 169 The political/popular and academic discourses are full
of explanations about why the lawmaking process, by its very
nature, results in loopholes. These include "mismatch theory,
which says that loopholes arise out of the unavoidable under- and
over-inclusiveness of rules," 1 70 political compromise, 171 or public
choice problems pursuant to which the voices of vocal minority
seeking the creation or protection of a "loophole" triumph over the
quieter voices of a diffuse majority. 172
Some critiques condemn both the process and the people, for
example, by suggesting that loopholes are created by intentional
agenda manipulation by legislators, whereby legislators introduce
"irrelevant items into the agenda" to influence "the relative
position of alternatives [in a voting process]," enabling loopholes
to get adopted (and/or not removed).1 73 Similarly, concerns that
political gridlock and obstructionism entrench loopholes condemn
both the people who engage in this behavior and the process that
allows it.174 The recent tax legislation process provides another
example. Many commentators argued that "new loopholes ripe for
exploitation" would be created as a result of the "rush to

169.
See, e.g., Logue, supra note 35, at 366.
170.
Katz, supra note 1, at 17.
171.
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 159 (suggesting that the "carried interest loophole"
has not been closed in part because proposals to close it have been repeatedly used as
bargaining chips in budget negotiations); see generally Surrey, supra note 8, at 1152-53
(discussing tax legislation as a product of legislative and political compromises).
172.
See, e.g., Stewart, supranote 159 (quoting Professor Daniel Shaviro suggesting a
public choice explanation for the persistence of the "carried interest loophole"); see generally
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV.
873, 906 (1987) (discussing the significant role that interest groups play in legislation).
173.
Katz, supra note 1, at 17.
174.
See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, DrugMerger Reignites Tax Reform Discussion, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/business/drug-merger-reignites-taxreform-discussion.html (suggesting that the Republican-controlled Congress's failure to
undertake an "overhaul of the loophole-laden corporate tax code" is driven by the politics of
wanting to preserve a "signature issue"); James B. Stewart, How Much Does Donald Trump
Pay in Taxes? It Could Be Zero, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/12fbusiness/how-much-does-donald-trump-pay-in-taxes-it-could-be-zero.html
(lamenting the lack of progress on loophole closing "given the gridlock over tax reform").
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passage"1 7 5 and "reckless speed"1 76 with which the 2017 Tax Act
was enacted. These were more than critiques of the lawmaking
process; they were also critiques of the Republican leaders who
pushed for hasty passage of the 2017 Tax Act with little
transparency and no bipartisan buy-in.17 7
Ultimately, when the criticism is of the people that comprise
Congress, some commentators merely expect the people to do
better,1 78 but often the goal is to oust the particular
lawmaker(s).1 7 9 Where the criticism is that loopholes are created
and retained through aspects of the lawmaking process that are
difficult to overcome, the desired response is less clear. Perhaps
the remedy is to restructure our lawmaking system or for
legislators to work harder to try to overcome these obstacles, but
given the pervasiveness of the obstacles, the likelihood of success
may be low.
Given the range of ways in which Congress can be critiqued
for the problem of loopholes, speakers who hold Congress
responsible should clearly articulate what Congress has done to
create or entrench the loophole problem; should explain whether
the critique is primarily about the people, the process, or both; and
should elaborate on the specific problem with the people or the
process that leads to the loophole problem. That provides the
foundation for discussing how the speaker expects Congress to
respond and for assessing the likelihood that Congress will take
the desired action.

Letter from Senator Robert Menedez et al. to Senator Orrin Hatch and
175.
Representative Kevin Brady (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/medial
[https://perma.cclK5TTdoc/Letter%20to%2oConferees%2OFinal%2oSigned%20PDF.pdf
RHSW]; see, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Haste on Tax Measures May Leave a Trail of Loopholes,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/business/economy/
corporate-tax.html ("[T]he rush to 'get it done' . . . [could create] new and unforeseen
complexity, loopholes and glitches [that] could come back to haunt tax collectors and
taxpayers.").
Jacob Leibenluft & Chye-Ching Huang, GOP ProcessDesigned to Obscure Tax Plan's
176.
Effects, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 6-7 (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/

sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-28-17tax.pdf [https://perma.cclJW3N-YRKY].
See, e.g., id.; Letter from Representative Terri A. Sewell to Representative Paul
177.
Ryan and Senator Mitch McConnell (Dec. 14, 2017), https://sewell.house.gov/sites/
sewell.house.gov/files/Sewell%2OLetter%20to%2OMcConnell%20and%2ORyan%2OUrging
(urging
%20Delay%20on%2Tax%2OConsiderationO.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JV4-CC26]
Republican leaders to delay the vote on the tax legislation-a request that they did not
honor).
See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 164 (quoting Professor Kleinbard implying that
178.
Congress should act to close loopholes for U.S. multinational corporations in order to
respond to the "moral imperative here").
See, e.g., Obama, supra note 162 (arguing against re-electing Republicans).
179.
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2. The Executive Branch: The President, the Treasury
Department & the IRS. Occasionally, the problem of "tax
loopholes" is blamed at least partly on members of the executive
branch.
Presidents, who often make campaign promises to close
loopholes, 18 0 are faulted for lack of leadership on stewarding
loophole-closing tax reform through Congress1 81 or for failing to
direct the Treasury Department to close loopholes via regulatory
action. 182
The Treasury Department is blamed for drafting regulations
that (either intentionally or because of various drafting problems,
unintentionally 8 3) create loopholes or for failing to revise or enact
regulations that close loopholes.18 4 These critiques imply that the
Treasury Department has failed to effectuate the will of Congress
and that the Treasury has shirked its responsibilities (a) by
drafting regulations that allow more taxpayers to avail themselves
of a particular statutory benefit than Congress intended18 5 or (b)
See, e.g., Barack Obama, Speech on Middle Class Tax Fairness (Sept. 18, 2007),
180.
[https://perma.cc/UAP5-RKBV]
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=93261
("I'll end the preferential treatment that's built into our tax code by eliminating corporate
loopholes and tax breaks."); Donald J. Trump, Remarks to the Detroit Economic Club (Aug.
8, 2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=119744&st=loophole&stl=
[https://perma.ccl9X8V-BTZQ] ("[W]e will eliminate the Carried Interest Deduction and
other special interest loopholes.").
See, e.g., Fox News: Special Report with Bret Baier (FOX television broadcast Apr.
181.
("[I]t
[https://perma.cc/L9MT-UNY4]
18, 2016), https://grabien.com/file.php?id=88252
[loophole closing and reducing rates] needs leadership. You've got to have a president who
campaigns on it, insists on it .... It's not impossible, but it is without a president."); Calmes,
supra note 174 ("Mr. Obama has hardly made corporate tax reform [including corporate
loophole closing] a priority'); Helaine Olen, At the Core of the GOP Tax Plan: A Huge Broken
Promise by Trump, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/2017/12/04/at-the-core-of-the-gop-tax-plan-a-huge-broken-promise-by-trump?utmterm=.684d8343f90c (faulting President Trump for "dodg[ing]" responsibility for fulfilling a
campaign promise to close the "carried interest loophole").
182.
See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Ending Tax Break for UltrawealthyMay Not Take Act
of Congress, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/business/endingtax-break-for-ultrawealthy-may-not-take-act-of-congress.html (discussing President Obama's
failure to instruct the Treasury Department to close the carried interest tax loophole).
Many of the same drafting problems that plague Congress can also affect the
183.
Treasury Department when they draft regulations). See supra notes 34 and 161 and
accompanying text.
184.
See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, When It Comes to Tax Avoidance, Donald Trump's
Just a Small Fry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/
business/dealbook/when-it-comes-to-tax-avoidance-donald-trumps-just-a-small-fry.htm
(implicitly criticizing the Treasury Department for the "loopholes" created by the entity
classification regulations for hybrid foreign entities).
185.
See, e.g., Emily Cauble, Was Blackstone's Public Initial Offering Too Good To Be
True?:A Case Study in Closing Loopholes in the PartnershipTax Allocation Rules, 14 FLA.
TAX REV. 153, 169-88 (2013) (arguing that the partnership tax allocation regulations create
a loophole); Sarah Muller, 'Exclusively' us. 'Primarily': IRS Law a 'Disaster Waiting to
Happen', MSNBC (May 23, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-wordlexclusively-vs
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by failing to draft regulations that would stop unintended
beneficiaries of "loopholes" from being able to continue to avail
themselves of the tax benefit. 186 On the other hand, the Treasury
is also occasionally criticized for overstepping in its efforts to close
loopholes.18 7 As with critiques of Congress, critiques of the
Treasury Department's role in the problem of "loopholes" can
accuse the people involved of moral failings,18 8 such as
inappropriately succumbing to the influence of lobbyists. 189
Further, the Internal Revenue Service is criticized for
ineffective enforcement that allows purported "loopholes" to
persist. 190 The IRS is encouraged to take stronger or more
strategic 91 enforcement action in order to "attack[] specific
loopholes in the tax code,"192 including by invoking the economic
substance doctrine and other similar doctrines, to curtail taxpayer

(Senator Baucus arguing that a loophole in Section 501(c)(4) is created because the
language in the regulations is more liberal than that in the statute).
See Bittker, supra note 6, at 1102-03 (discussing the challenge faced by the
186.
Treasury upon discovering loopholes that are legislative errors); see also Morgenson, supra
note 182 (lamenting that the Treasury has not "taken an interest" in closing the "carried
interest loophole" through regulatory action, and suggesting that the Treasury shirks its
responsibilities by "punting" on the issue).
See, e.g., A Stealth Death Tax Icrease, supra note 132 (arguing that, in its effort
187.
to close an estate planning "loophole," the Treasury's regulations will create "economic
destruction"); Noam Scheiber & Patricia Cohen, For the Wealthiest, a Private Tax System
That Saves Them Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/30/business/economy/for-the-wealthiest-private-tax-system-saves-thembillions.html (noting that some trade groups argued that the "proposed rules tightening the
hedge fund insurance loophole are too onerous").
See, e.g., How U.S. Treasury's Tax Loophole Mistake Saves Companies Billions
188.
Each Year, REUTERS (May 30, 2013) https://www.reuters.comlarticle/usa-tax-checkthebox/
insight-how-u-s-treasurys-tax-loophole-mistake-saves-companies-billions-each-yearidUSL2N0E90RO20130530 (discussing Treasury's role in creating and perpetuating the
"check the box" "loophole," and criticizing "Washington's 'revolving door' culture of policymaking and lobbying" as self-serving, explaining that "[s]ome of the bureaucrats who helped
to write the rule went on to work for corporations that used it to lower their tax bills.").
See, e.g., CNN Live Event/Special, supra note 167 ("When enormous Wall Street
189.
banks wanted new regulatory loopholes, Washington got it done.").
See, e.g., Zachary R. Mider, Accidental Tax Break Saves Wealthiest Americans
190.
$100 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201312-17/accidental-tax-break-saves-wealthiest-americans-100-billion (faulting the IRS for its
R.
Hagerty,
James
'loophole");
GRAT
to
the
challenge
unsuccessful
PricewaterhouseCoopersExecutives Grilled at Senate Hearing Over Caterpillar'sTaxes,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pricewaterhousecoopers-executives(Senator Carl Levin
grilled-at-senate-hearing-over-caterpilars-taxes-1396375134?tesla=y
pushing for tougher IRS enforcement to close loopholes).
See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Are Judges Just English Teachers?, 151 TAX
191.
NOTES 1553, 1553 (2016) (criticizing the IRS's strategy in a tax shelter case that the
taxpayer won).
192.
Richard Rubin, Hillary Clinton Targets Tax Hikes at the Very Top, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-clinton-targets-tax-hikes-at-the-verytop-1475863171.
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attempts to exploit loopholes. 193 Similarly, state tax enforcement
agencies are encouraged to do more, including by working together
(e.g., through information sharing) to "fight abusive tax-avoidance
schemes" and close loopholes. 194
Given the different players in the executive branch that might
be held responsible for the problem of loopholes and given the
different critiques and desired responses, it is again important for
a speaker who condemns loopholes to be explicit about whom she
blames for the problem, how that party has failed, and what that
party (or another) should do in response. Although there is ample
criticism of the role of the executive branch in the problem of
loopholes, some are optimistic about the Treasury's ability to enact
administrative guidance and the IRS's ability to enforce that
guidance in order to close loopholes; as Justice Breyer said during
the oral arguments for the Home Concrete case, "If you live by
loopholes, you will die by regulation."1 95
3. The Judicial Branch. Sometimes the blame for
"loopholes" is cast on courts and the way in which they interpret
the law. Again, the critiques vary. Sometimes the critique is about
courts interpreting the law too generously, in a way that creates
an exception or that allows favorable treatment to which the
speaker objects.1 96 Other times, the critique is about courts failing
to interpret the law in a way that overcomes a clear drafting
problem. 197 The speaker suggests that the courts enable the
persistence of a "loophole" by employing a literalist interpretation
rather than an interpretation that incorporates legislative intent;
instead, the speaker suggests that the court should decide that a
particular tax preference violates the law under the economic

193.
See, e.g., Soled & Gans, supra note 116, at 999-1000 (discussing the IRS's use of
the economic substance doctrine to "defeat abusive tax-minimization strategies").
194.
See, e.g., LeAnn Luna, Corporate Tax Avoidance Strategies and States' Efforts to
Prevent Abuses, J. MULTISTATE TAx'N & INCENTIVES, May 2004, at 6, 17 (discussing the
partnership between many states and the IRS "to share information" about "abusive
transactions").
195.
Kristin E. Hickman, Home Concrete: Impressions from the Oral Argument, 134
TAX NOTES 579, 582 (2012) (quoting Justice Breyer).
196.
See, e.g., Rebecca O'Toole & Sabrina Lai, Treasury Makes Waves with New
Valuation DiscountProposals,153 TAX NOTES 81, 82 (2016) (discussing the courts' approval
of valuation discounts, which arguably enabled 'loopholes" in estate/gift tax laws); Claire
Y. Nash & James Parker, VCSP Amnesty Unlikely to Reduce Employment Tax Gap, 138
TAX NOTES 620, 624 (2013) (discussing the courts' interpretation of Section 530 as
"provid[ing] a loophole through which taxpayers that have misclassified workers can escape
penalties . .. and also can avoid the payment of employment taxes").
197.
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 6, at 1105-O8 (discussing when and whether courts
"come to the rescue by holding that the letter of the law is not controlling, and that the
legislative purpose ... must prevail over the scrivener's deficiency").
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substance doctrine or under common law doctrines such as step
transaction or sham transaction. 198
On the other hand, others suggest that it is not the
responsibility of courts to overcome statutory language that
creates loopholes, 199 or that, even when courts try to interpret the
law in a way that closes (or prevents) loopholes, courts' efforts have
"[n]ot [worked out] well at all." 2 00

Given the foregoing, where courts are blamed for a loophole,
the speaker should be specific about what she believes the court
should have done differently; the authority that would enable the
court to take a better approach; and why the court, rather than
another party such as Congress, ought to address the problem.
4. Taxpayers (Including Their Lobbyists). Some of the most
frequent targets of criticism in the "tax loophole" discourse are
taxpayers themselves. Taxpayers are criticized both for their role
in the lawmaking process (i.e., the creation and retention of
loopholes) and for their use of loopholes.
A common critique is that taxpayers (particularly the rich,
powerful, and connected, whether individuals or corporations) and
their lobbyists use their position, influence, and campaign
contributionS 201 to get tax preferences that benefit them inserted
into the tax code 202 and to protect those tax preferences from being
removed. 203 Other commentators who condemn taxpayers for the
198.
See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 191 at 1553, 1557-59 (criticizing a recent court
decision for its literalist approach that resulted in a taxpayer victory in a tax shelter case);
see also supra note 72 (discussing different judicial approaches to loopholes).
199.
See, e.g., Frank Lee, You Must Remember This: A DISC is not a DISC, Its Fee Is
But a Lie, 148 TAx NOTES 1395, 1399 (2015) ("[W]hen the IRS or the court cannot articulate
a technically sound legal theory on which to disregard the language of a statute-as much
as we may all agree that the statute creates an unintended loophole-some of us would still
argue that it is the exclusive province of Congress to rewrite the statute.").
200.
Katz, supra note 1, at 5.
201.
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 159 (quoting Professor Daniel Shaviro for the
proposition that "one reason the [carried interest] loophole has survived as long it has [is
because] '[t]he group that benefits may be small, but they're rich and they give a lot of
money' to politicians"); Edwards, supra note 168 ("[T]ax loopholes ... are not going to be
closed, all because Democrats-our party-wanted their campaign money.").
202.
See, e.g., Paul, supra note 130 ("[Mlost of the loopholes in the tax code were designed
by the rich and politically connected."); Barack Obama, Keeping America's Promise (Feb. 13,
2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77032 [https/perma.cclGR3R-3F76]
("[Olur tax code ... has been rigged by lobbyists with page after page of loopholes that benefit
big corporations and the wealthiest few."); see also generally Surrey, supra note 8, at 1160-61
(discussing the role of lobbyists in getting special interest tax provisions enacted).
203.
See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Liz Moyer, Hospitality and Gambling Interests Delay
Closing of Billion-Dollar Tax
Loophole,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
20,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/us/politics/hospitality-and-gambling-interests-delayclosing-of-dollarl-billion-tax-loophole.html ("[L]obbyists swooped in to add 54 words that
temporarily preserved a loophole sought by the hotel, restaurant and gambling
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problem of "loopholes" are less concerned about lobbyists and are
more concerned about the taxpayers who avail themselves of the
particular tax preference. 204
Speakers seem to have a few different concerns and goals
when criticizing taxpayers for using, or lobbying for the creation
or retention of, loopholes.
One concern is the impact on tax morale, perceptions of
fairness, 205 and tax compliance. Specifically, the taxpayer, by
lobbying for loopholes or by using loopholes for "tax avoidance
[particularly when the taxpayer is some high-profile taxpayer such
as Donald Trump] undermines the entire tax system, which rests
on the foundation that every citizen pays a fair share." 2 0 6 This type
of behavior "deepens public cynicism about the tax system" 20 7 and
encourages other taxpayers to seek out loopholes. 208
A second concern is that the taxpayers cause the normative
policy problems discussed in the first dimension of the taxonomy.
Most commonly, the concern is about taxpayers' role in
exacerbating unfairness-that when rich taxpayers use their
wealth to hire lobbyists to create/protect loopholes or to hire
sophisticated tax advisers to find and help them exploit loopholes
that are not available to most taxpayers (who lack the resources
to hire such sophisticated tax advisers), these rich taxpayers

industries . . ."); President Barack Obama, Statement on Private Equity Firms (Oct. 9,
2007),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=90976
[https://perma.cclW8K9-UJ7K]
(asserting that Congressional inaction on the carried interest loophole is a result of
lobbyists); Curry, supra note 66 (blaming the failure to close the "carried interest loophole"
at least in part on a "political system in which hedge funds and private equity investors
have outsized influence in both the House and Senate").
204.
See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, CorporateInversionsAren't the Half of It, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/business/dealbook/corporateinversions-arent-the-half-of-it.html
("American companies that have inverted are
particularly poor expatriates, willing to take aggressive acts to exploit this tax loophole.");
Norman Eisen & Richard W. Painter, The White House Rule: No Tax Returns, No Job, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/07/opinion/the-white-house-ruleno-tax-returns-no-job.html (noting that, during the Bush and Obama administrations, use
of loopholes "doomed" political nominees, and criticizing "[s]ome corporate directors and
chief executives [who try] . . . to justify selfish decisions to use loopholes").
205.
See, e.g., O'Reilly Factor (Fox Broadcast June 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/8DGPU9GW ("Americans know it's a corrupt system. Americans know that the rich in the end
will not pay the rates that are posted because they have the lobbyists.").
206.
James B. Stewart, How Donald Trump Turned the Tax Code Into a Giant Tax
Shelter, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/business/howdonald-trump-turned-the-tax-code-into-a-giant-tax-shelter.html.
207.
Greg Ip, Apple's Tax Avoidance Illustrates Gap Between Law and Economics,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2016, 12:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apples-tax-avoidanceillustrates-gap-between-law-and-economics-1473264984
(discussing Apple's use of
loopholes).
208.
See Logue, supra note 42, at 249 ("Once an unintended loophole is found to work
for one taxpayer, there is a natural tendency for others to use it as well.").
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create unfairness; they get tax benefits that other similarly
situated taxpayers do not merely because they are already rich,
thereby making the rich richer. 209 Occasionally, taxpayers' use of
loopholes is criticized for exacerbating other policy problems. For
example, one commentator criticized taxpayers for "pursuing
financial engineering" strategies that take advantage of loopholes
rather than fixing "troubled core businesses,"210 implying that the
taxpayers' pursuit of loopholes misallocates resources and creates
economic inefficiency.
A third, and very common, objective for those who criticize
taxpayers for their use of loopholes is to impugn the character or
judgment of the particular taxpayer(s) who uses the loophole. This
criticism often uses vitriolic language and conveys strong moral
condemnation, with commentators asserting that the taxpayers
are perpetrating a "scam"21 1 and are "irresponsible," 2 12
"unsavory," 213 "selfish," 214 "unpatriotic," 215 cheaters, 216 and more.
Some of this rhetoric is merely about association 217-linking the
bad connotation of "loopholes" with a particular person to suggest
that the person is also bad. This often arises in attacks on political
candidates/nominees who used "loopholes" in their personal

209.
See Scheiber & Cohen, supra note 187 ("There's this notion that the wealthy use
their money to buy politicians; more accurately, it's that they can buy ...
tax
policy .... The wealthy can also avail themselves of a range of esoteric and customized tax
deductions . . .. Almost all are outside the price range of the average taxpayer . . .. We do

have two different tax systems, one for normal wage-earners, and another for those who
can afford sophisticated advice."); Legal View (CNN television broadcast Apr. 5, 2016),
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1604/05/lvab.01.html ("[P]eople, if they've got
enough lawyers and enough accountants [can use loopholes like inverting] to wiggl[e] out
of responsibilities that ordinary citizens are having to abide by.").
210.
Rob Cox, Pfizer's Deal for Allergan is a Dubious Milestone, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1,
2015), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/business/dealbook/pfizers-deal-for-allerganis-a-dubious-milestone.html.
211.
The Situation Room (CNN Broadcast Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1509/29/sitroom.01.html (regarding those who use the carried interests
loophole").
212.
Legal View, supra note 209 (regarding the inversion of "loophole").
213.
Eisen & Painter, supra note 204 (regarding use of loopholes by nominees for
political appointments).
214.
Id.
215.
Id.; see also President Barack Obama, The President's Weekly Address (July 26,
2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/26/weekly-addressclosing-corporate-tax-loopholes.
216.
See Ostas, supra note 36, at 509-10 (using a loophole to "rationalize breaches of
formal law properly interpreted").
217.
See generally MCGEE, supra note 11, at 2 (describing association as a causal
fallacy); Dan Kurland, How LanguageReally Works: The Fundamentalsof CriticalReading
and Effective Writing (2000), http://www.criticalreading.com/inferenceassociation.htm
[https://perma.cc/W484-ND86] ("Association invokes ideas and feelings through a
particular reference.").
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taxes. 2 18 In these contexts, slightly more specific allegations
include that the use of loopholes by these individuals
demonstrates that they are unworthy of support because they are
hypocrites (i.e., for using loopholes but then campaigning that they
will close loopholes), 219 bad role models, 220 selfish and greedy, 22 1
and lacking "commitment to the public good," 2 2 2 among other
character flaws.
The response desired by someone who blames taxpayers for
the problem of "loopholes" depends on which critique the speaker
means. If the concern is about lobbying, the response could include
for lobbyists to stop lobbying and for taxpayers to stop paying
lobbyists to lobby (seemingly unlikely); for members of Congress
to better withstand the efforts of lobbyists; 223 or for Congress to
change the laws in order to limit lobbying. 224 If the concern is about
the taxpayers' use of the loopholes, a range of responses could also
result. For example, when political candidates are attacked for
their use of loopholes, speakers clearly hope that voters will not
support the candidates. For other taxpayers, the speaker might
hope that the taxpayer and other similar taxpayers decide not to
use the loopholes in the future. But unless a taxpayer becomes
subject to a huge amount of negative publicity that pressures the
taxpayer into changing course, taxpayers are unlikely to stop
using loopholes. As one commentator remarked, "[s]ometimes
using loopholes in the tax laws can get sketchy, but most of us
would use them if we had the opportunity." 2 2 5 Or the speaker

See, e.g., Vice-Presidential Debate (Oct. 5, 2004), http://www.debates.org/
218.
index.php?page=october-5-2004-transcript [https://perma.cclBH5N-EW3C] (featuring VicePresident Cheney and Senator Edwards trading barbs about the other's use of tax loopholes
implicitly trying to impugn each other's character).
See, e.g., Richard Rubin, Clinton Seeks Big Jump in Estate Tax, WALL ST. J.
219.
(Sept. 22, 2016, 7:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/clinton-seeks-big-jump-in-estatetax-1474588735 (quoting a spokesman for Trump as saying "It is the height of hypocrisy for
Hillary Clinton to offer an even more dramatic hike in the death tax at the same time she
uses exotic tax loopholes reserved for the very wealthy to exempt her Chappaqua estate").
See, e.g., Eisen & Painter, supra note 204 (suggesting that the "unsavory use of
220.
tax loopholes" is contrary to the notion that "many of us want to set an example that teaches
our children the responsibilities as well as the enormous benefits of being an American").
221.
See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Keep the Returns, Trump; Just Give Us a Few Figures,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/business/2-numbers-cananswer-the-donald-trump-tax-question.html (criticizing Trump for not calling to close any
loopholes that would affect him).
Arthur Russell, Letter to the Editor, The UproarOver Trump's Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
222.
Oct. 4, 2016, at A22.
See supranote 178 and accompanying text.
223.
See, e.g., Obama, supra note 203 (arguing, as part of his condemnation of the
224.
"carried interest loophole," for "the strongest lobbying reform in history").
Courtney Calvert, Letter to the Editor, The Uproar Over Trump's Taxes, N.Y.
225.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2016, at A22; The Five (Fox News Broadcast Feb. 8, 2016),
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might look toward other parties for solutions, hoping that either
Congress (or the Treasury Department) will change the tax code
(or regulations) to prevent taxpayers from using the tax
preference 226 or that tax advisors will stop (or will be required to
stop) assisting taxpayers in the pursuit of loopholes. 227
Ultimately, when holding taxpayers themselves responsible
for the problem of "tax loopholes," it is important for speakers to
specify which actions of the taxpayer are problematic, why the
actions create a problem, and what they hope the taxpayers (or
others) will do in response.
5. Tax Advisors. Critics of taxpayers who use loopholes also
suggest that tax advisors deserve blame. 228 This is because
taxpayers would not know of or be able to avail themselves of the
loopholes without the "enterprising"229 and "smart lawyers [who]
pour [] over the tax code like a bunch of sleuths looking for
[loopholes,]" 230 and who use "magical power" 23 1 to "devis[e]
strategies to get around [taxes]" 232 and "around the intent of the
law." 2 3 3 Indeed, in some discourse surrounding the 2017 Tax Act,
tax advisors are portrayed as practically salivating over the
opportunity to find and exploit loopholes created by new laws. 2 34
Commentators who blame tax advisors for the problem of
loopholes imply that tax planning is an amoral (or perhaps
immoral) vocation in which people who are too clever profit by
finding ways to undermine the tax law, 2 3 5 and they imply that
http://video.foxnews.com/v/4745058009001/#sp=show-clips (objecting to a private person
using a legal opportunity for their own benefit is "like saying [you're] not going to use this
tax loophole because some conservatives don't like the tax loophole. You're still going to
take it.").
226.
See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 164 (condemning taxpayers for using the inversion
"loophole" but arguing that it is Congress's responsibility to stop taxpayers from being able
to invert).
227.
See infra Part III.B.5.
228.
See, e.g., Legal View, supranote 209 ("[P]eople, if they've got enough lawyers and
enough accountants [can use loopholes like inverting] to wiggl[e] out of responsibilities that
ordinary citizens are having to abide by."); Evans, supra note 26, at 78 ("[Lloopholes are
something which must be located by tax experts-specifically tax lawyers.").
MSNBC, supra note 116.
229.
230.
CNN RADIO, supra note 101.
231.
Bittker, supra note 6, at 1109.
232.
Mider, supra note 190.
233.
CNN RADIO, supra note 101; see also, e.g., Katz, supra note 1, at 2 ("[C]lever
lawyers . .. help their clients do things that appear to subvert [the law's] purpose.").
284 See, e.g., Kitroeff, supra note 19 ("Already, lawyers and accountants are eyeing several
provisions that investors and companies could potentially exploit.").
See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in
235.
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/appleshas been particularly
tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html ("Apple ...
talented at identifying legal tax loopholes and hiring accountants who, as much as iPhone
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facilitating the use of loopholes makes the facilitator complicit in
offensive taxpayer behavior (especially if the facilitator earns a
share of the taxpayer's tax benefit). 236 Ultimately, beyond moral
condemnation, critics suggest that tax advisor behavior is
problematic because it creates inequitieS 2 37 and other policy
problemS 2 38 discussed in the first part of the taxonomy.
In response, critics might want tax advisors to stop
facilitating "loophole" tax planning. They are unlikely to stop,
however, because tax planning is their livelihood, 239 and many
believe that "lawyers rarely have to feel bad about using
[loopholes]."240 Thus, critics might instead hope that Congress or
the Treasury will increase the ethical standards of practice for tax
advisors in order to curtail loophole-facilitating behavior by tax
advisors. 24 1
6. Conclusion about Dimension #2 (Responsible Party).
Critics often blame multiple parties for the problem of loopholes,
and a common combination is to blame both taxpayers and
Congress. 242 As with the first dimension of the taxonomy, multiple
blameworthy parties can be accommodated by this Article's
taxonomy. 243 Regardless of which party (or parties) a critic of
"loopholes" holds responsible for the problem of loopholes, she
should clearly identify the blameworthy party, specify the party's
actions that make the party culpable, explain why the actions are
problematic, and articulate what she wants the party (or some
other party) to do in response.
Being explicit about the parties who are to blame and from
whom action is desired moves the conversation from rhetoric to
designers, are known for their innovation."); Scheiber & Cohen, supra note 187, at A14
("Among tax lawyers and accountants, 'the best and brightest get a high from figuring out
how to do tricky little deals . . . ."').
236.
See, e.g., Jenny Strasburg et al., Deutsche Bank HeadquartersRaided in TaxFraud Probe, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/deutsche-bankconfirms-headquarters-searched-by-police-1433843564 (condemning a bank that "earned a
share of whatever profit their clients earned" for its involvement in facilitating the use of
the tax loophole).
237.
See, e.g., Logue, supra note 35, at 366; Scheiber & Cohen, supra note 187.
238.
See, e.g., Logue, supra note 42, at 249 ("inefficiency" and "maldistribution of
resources").
239.
But see Heather M. Field, Aggressive Tax Planning & the Ethical Tax Lawyer, 36 VA.
TAX REV. 261, 268, 282 (2017) (discussing how tax advisers can still pursue their livelihoods as
tax planners but not engage in what they consider to be aggressive "loophole lawyering").
240.
Katz, supranote 1, at 2.
241.
See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising
Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX. REV. 583, 604-05 (2006);
Jackel, supra note 26, at 670.
242.
See, e.g., Hillary Clinton'sPfizer Follies,supra note 108; Stewart, supra note 159.
243.
See supra Part III.A.6.
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potential solutions-who is being requested to do what? Then, a
conversation can be had about whether that is the right party to
respond, how exactly that party should respond, whether the
response is likely to curtail the identified loophole, and more.
Moreover, these details help overcome the rhetorical strategy of
using mere association with loopholes to condemn a particular
party. 244 If speakers explain why the responsible party is worthy
of criticism and what normative policy problems that party has
created, listeners will be better able to assess whether they agree
that the responsible party is truly worthy of criticism.
C.

Puttingthe Dimensions of the Taxonomy Together

Often, both dimensions of the taxonomy are needed to
understand a use of the term "loophole" because a critic
condemning "loopholes" is both implying a policy objection to the
tax preference and casting blame for that policy problem on
someone in particular. By teasing out the details of any reference
to a "loophole" using both of these axes, the critique becomes
substantive-focused on the policy concerns that motivate the
critique-and potentially actionable-focused on which party
should do what in response.
The benefit of the taxonomy, however, at least for purposes of
translating individual "loophole" references into actionable and
substantive discussion, also requires the identification of the
specific tax preference to which the speaker objects. Too often,
however, speakers rely on "mystery meat," 245 referring to generic
loopholes and relying on exhortations that they will (or others
should) "close tax loopholes" without identifying those purported
loopholes with any specificity, 2 4 6 even when expressly requested to
provide details. 24 7 These references to generic loopholes, even if
See supra notes 9, 217 and accompanying text.
244.
245.
Paul Krugman, Clash of Republican Con Artists, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/opinion/clash-of-republican-con-artists.html
(criticizing Paul Ryan's budget proposals as "completely reliant on 'mystery meat'. . . [and
as] claim[ing that] trillions of dollars in revenue can be collected by closing unspecified tax
loopholes").
246.
See, e.g., Hillary Clinton, Remarks at Curtis Hixon Waterfront Part in Tampa,
2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=119693
Florida (Oct. 26,
[https://perma.ccl5FTS-FUSC] ("we're going to close the [unspecified] loopholes and make
sure no multimillionaire ever pays a lower tax rate than a nurse or a teacher or a police
officer or a firefighter."); Donald J. Trump, Remarks to the Detroit Economic Club (Aug. 8,
2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=119744 [https://perma.ccfW77RWVZ2] ("[W]e will eliminate the Carried Interest Deduction and other [unnamed] special
interest loopholes that have been so good for Wall Street investors . . . .").
247.
See, e.g., Michael O'Brien, In Virginia Debate, Cuccinelli Tries to Close the Gender
Gap, MSNBC (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/the-daily-rundown/va-debatecuccinelli-tries-close-the (discussing the Virginia gubernatorial debate and explaining that
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coupled with the articulation of specific policy concerns and the
explicit identification of responsible parties, stymie meaningful
discussion because listeners do not know which loophole is at
issue. And generic "loophole" references obfuscate, thereby
creating a sense of artificial agreement among listeners, each of
whom might have very different ideas about which "loopholes"
create the particular policy concern and can be addressed by the
particular party.248 Thus, there is an important third element to
the taxonomy. Specifically, in order for the taxonomy to translate
rhetoric about individual "loopholes" into substantive and
actionable debate, the specific tax preference must be identified.
IV. APPLYING THE TAXONOMY
Although Part III's explanation of the taxonomy focused on
interpreting individual statements that condemn "tax loopholes,"
the utility of the taxonomy is not limited to improving the
discourse with an individual speaker.
The taxonomy can also be used to understand and improve
multi-speaker debates about particular tax preferences. In
addition, the taxonomy can be used in the aggregate, even without
identification of particular tax preferences, to better understand
groups of people and how they perceive the tax system. This part
will briefly illustrate both of these additional applications of the
taxonomy.
A.

To Multi-Speaker Debates about ParticularTax Preferences:
Understandingthe Debate about the "CarriedInterest
Loophole"

The taxonomy provides insights into the debate surrounding
the "carried interest loophole," pursuant to which private equity
and venture capital fund managers generally pay taxes at
preferential long-term capital gains rates on income they earn on
account of the stake in a fund that they received in exchange for
providing services to that fund. 249 The 2017 Tax Act changed this
"[w]hen pressed to specify which tax loopholes he would close to finance his tax cut plan,
Cuccinelli responded: 'There's literally scores of them.").
248.
See, e.g., Peter Nicholas, Hillary Clinton Calls for $2 Billion in Alzheimer's
Research, Cure by 2025, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2015) https://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary("The campaign
cinton-calls-for-increase-in-alzheimers-research-funding-1450821851
didn't provide specifics of how she would cover the cost of the expanded [Alzheimer's]
research, other than to say she has called for tax-law changes that would close corporate
loopholes and raise taxes on wealthier Americans.").
See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., JCX-62-07, PRESENT LAW
249.
AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND
RELATED ISSUES PART 121-26 (Sept. 4, 2007).
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historic tax treatment of carried interests only slightly by
requiring a three-year (rather than only one-year) holding period
in order for the holder of the carried interest to benefit from
preferential long-term capital gains rates. 250
There is a large academic literature about the tax treatment
of "carried interests," 25 1 and this issue has been picked up in the
popular and political discourse. Some of this broader discourse
refers to the tax treatment of "carried interests" as a "loophole"
and calls for reform. Using the taxonomy to parse the recent
popular/political discourse about "carried interest loopholes"

252

provides insight into the substantive concerns that resonate
among those in the broader public who apply. the "loophole" label
to the tax treatment of "carried interests" and the actions that
these commentators want taken.
Specifically, on the first dimension of the taxonomy, critics of
the "carried interest loophole" appear most concerned about
fairness. 253 However, the details of the fairness concern vary
somewhat, with some speakers more concerned that the rich254 are
receiving an unjustified benefit, others more concerned that a
special interest, namely the private equity and venture capital
fund industry, 255 is receiving an unjustified benefit. Although
some express concerns about both, 256 Donald Trump, for example,
seemed to draw a distinction between the rich and the fund

250.
2017 Tax Act § 13309 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1061).
251.
See generally Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in
PrivateEquity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008); Heather M. Field, The Real Problem with
Carried Interests, 65 HAST. L.J. 405 (2014); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried
Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715, 719 (2008).
252.
This discussion focuses only on articles and commentary that describe the tax
treatment of carried interests as a "loophole." There is a larger discourse that uses more
neutral terminology, but because the goal of this Article is to translate the loophole
discourse into substantive conversation, this part of the Article focuses only on those
commentaries that characterize the tax treatment of carried interest as a loophole."
253.
See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, De Blasio Returning to the National Political
Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/nyregion/deblasio-returning-to-the-national-political-stage.html ("[Elliminating tax loopholes for the
income of some investment managers [can help combat inequality]."); Patricof, supra note
113 (closing the "carried interest loophole" "comes back to a question of fairness").
254.
See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 182 (closing the "carried interest loophole"
"would take away an enormous benefit enjoyed almost exclusively by some of the country's
wealthiest people ... The carried interest loophole contributes substantially to the increase
in top-end inequality in the United States").
255.
See Albert R. Hunt, G.O.P. DebatesFail to Give Voters Basic Details, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/us/politics/gop-debates-fail-to-givevoters-basic-details.html?smid=pl-share ("Mr. Trump stresses that he would end the
carried interest tax loophole benefitting private-equity and hedge fund executives.").
256.
Stewart, supra note 159 (discussing the "carried interest loophole" as benefiting
both the "hedge fund guys" and the "wealthiest Americans").
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industry, 257 and the proposals he advanced as a candidate, in the
aggregate, sought to close the "carried interest loophole" for the
fund industry while at the same time bringing down overall rates
on the wealthy. 258 Others discuss (often in addition to the fairness
concern) the opportunity to raise a large amount of revenue byclosing this loophole. 259 And yet some defend the purported
"loophole" primarily on the grounds that the tax treatment of
carried interests "foster [s] entrepreneurial risk-taking" and
benefits the economy. 260
Parsing out these different policy concerns underlying the
debate about the "carried interest loophole" provides useful insight
about the precise loophole-closing strategy that would respond to
the policy concern. For example, to the extent that the real concern
is about rich people paying tax at rates that are too low, then
perhaps the appropriate response is to increase the long-term
capital gains rate, or even the ordinary income tax rate, for all
high-income people. 26 1 But to the extent that the concern is really
about the fund industry unjustly benefiting from a tax preference,
perhaps the appropriate response is to prevent the application of
the partnership tax rules (i.e., the operative tax rules that work
together to produce the objectionable result) to funds or to more
strictly regulate the fund industry. 262 And if the concern really is
revenue, again, more comprehensive reform (e.g., increasing
257.
See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, 9 Times Donald Trump Complained About Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/us/politics/trump-taxestwitter.html?smid=pl-share(highlighting seemingly conflicting tweets from Donald Trump,
one arguing that taxes on hedge fund managers have to go up, and another arguing that
the wealthy pay too much tax); Hunt, supra note 255 (noting that while Trump advocated
closing the "carried interest loophole" that benefits the fund industry, he "tried to
camouflage [his] plans' heavy tilt in favor of the more affluent").
See, e.g., Albert R. Hunt, The Debate Over Taxes That Isn't Happening, N.Y. TIMES
258.
(Aug. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/22/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clintonthe-debate-over-taxes-that-isnt-happening.html?smid=pl-share ("Mr. Trump says he will end
the tax loophole that lets some private equity and hedge fund executives pay a lower capital
gains rate on earned income. But his plan would allow many of these executives to pay personal
taxes at the 15 percent corporate rate, which would do the same thing").
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 159. ("Estimates of how much revenue closing the
259.
loophole would raise vary . . . . The Treasury estimates it would raise $18 billion over 10
years; Professor Fleischer contends it would be 10 times that much, $180 billion.").
Calmes, supra note 127 (citing arguments of the Private Equity Growth Capital
260.
Council); see also Steven B. Klinsky, The CarriedInterest Loophole? What Loophole?, N.Y.
TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/dealbook/the-carriedinterest-loophole-what-loophole.html(defending the tax treatment of carried interests).
Field, supra note 251, at 429-30, 437-38.
261.
Id. at 434-36, 438-39; see also, e.g., Gina Chon, Critics Are Lining Up to Qppose
262.
Changes to Dodd-FrankLaw, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/
(when
business/dealbook/critics-are-lining-up-to-oppose-changes-to-dodd-frank-law.html
discussing possible closure of the carried interest 'loophole," also suggesting regulating the
fund industry).

594

HOUSTON LA WREVIEW

[55:3

LTCG rates for all high-income taxpayers or reforming how
partnership tax law treats compensatory grants of equity
interests) would likely be more responsive than a very narrowly
targeted new code section. 263 That is, given the particular policy
concerns articulated or implied by critics of the "carried interest
loophole," it is not clear that the most frequent tax reform
proposal 264-a very narrowly targeted new code section-is the
right response. Moreover, none of these policy concerns is
meaningfully addressed by the 2017 Tax Act's change to the
holding period required for the owner of a carried interest to
benefit from preferential long-term capital gains rates. 265
On the second dimension of the taxonomy, commentators
condemn various parties. They blame governmental partiesCongress for not closing the loophole, 266 the Treasury Department
for not closing the loophole or for taking the position that they lack
the authority to close the loophole, 267 the President for not showing
sufficient leadership or initiative to get the tax treatment of
carried interest changed. 268 And they blame private partiesmembers of the fund industry for using the loophole 269 and for
lobbying to prevent its closure. 270 This lack of consensus about who
is to blame for the existence and retention of the "carried interest
loophole" suggests that there may not be a clear path to a solution.
263.
Field, supra note 251, at 436-37.
264.
See, e.g., In the Red Act of 2016, S. 2677, 1 1411, Cong. (2016); Cut Unjustified Tax
Loopholes Act, S. 268, 113th Cong. (2013) (both proposing to add new Section 710, which
would be very narrowly tailored).
See James B. Stewart, Tax Loophole for the Rich that Won't Die, N.Y. TIMES
265.
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/business/carried-interest-tax-loophole.html
("[The primary argument against the carried interest loophole isn't that those who benefit
from it don't hold their assets long enough.").
266.
See, e.g., id.; Stewart, supra note 159 (noting "efforts to kill [carried interest tax
reform] in Congress"); Goldstein & Hsu, supra note 159 (faulting the House and Senate for
failing to close the "carried interest loophole" as part of the 2017 tax legislation).
See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 182, at 2 (lamenting Treasury's assessment that
267.
it "cannot eliminate the carried interest tax benefit by itself' because Treasury's inaction
"means nothing is likely to be done").
See id. at 1-2 ("[Closing the carried interest loophole is] something that Obama
268.
could accomplish," but lamenting that he has not gotten the Treasury to act); Olen, supra
note 181 (faulting President Trump for not pushing Congress to close the "carried interest
loophole" as part of the 2017 tax legislation).
See, e.g., Confessore, supranote 257 (quoting Donald Trump attacking the "hedge
269.
fund guys ([and] gals)" for using the "carried interest loophole" so that they "pay[]
practically nothing").'
Scheiber & Cohen, supra note 187 (citing the role of lobbyists in preserving the tax
270.
treatment of carried interests); Stewart, supra note 159 (same); Alan Rappeport, Trump
Promised to Kill Carried Interest. Lobbyists Kept It Alive., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017)
(citing
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/business/trump-carried-interest-lobbyists.html
White House officials, who blamed lobbyists for the failure of the 2017 Tax Act to close the
"carried interest loophole").
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Indeed, although the 2017 Tax Act made many sweeping changes
to the U.S. tax law, this recent legislation did not close the "carried
interest loophole."
Ultimately, even this very brief inquiry into how the term "tax
loophole" has been used among recent media and political
commentators in the "carried interest" debate reveals a broad
range of policy concerns implicated and parties to blame. And this
divergence in views about the policy problems with, and
responsibility for, the "carried interest loophole" may help explain
why it has been so challenging for policymakers to agree on and
implement responsive reform.
B. In the Aggregate: Understandingthe Media Discourse
Leading Up to the 2016 PresidentialElection
The taxonomy can also be used in the aggregate, even without
references to specific "loopholes," in order to better understand
groups of people and how they perceive the tax system.
To illustrate this function, I applied the taxonomy to the tax
loophole discourse in two television news media sources (CNN and
Fox) and in two print media sources (Wall Street Journal and New
York Times) during the 2016 presidential campaign.
This part briefly describes the methodology for this study, and
then describes the insights gleaned from this study. The results of
the study are reflected in Appendix A (dimension #1) and
Appendix B (dimension #2).
1. Methodology. The four sets of media sources-CNN
transcripts, Fox transcripts, Wall Street Journal ("WSJ") articles,
and New York Times ("NYT") articles-were selected based on the
Pew Research Center's 2014 study about political polarization in
the media, 271 the results of which are quite similar to the Pew
Research Center's very recent report about media news sources
used leading up to the 2016 presidential election. 272 According to
Pew, CNN and Fox News are the most common sources of news
about government and politics in the U.S.273 Fox News has been

271.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, POLITICAL POLARIZATION & MEDIA HABITS: FROM Fox
NEWS TO FACEBOO, How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES KEEP UP WITH POLITICS AT 3-4

(Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/
[https://perma.cc/7A2F-6LGS] [hereinafter PEW 2014].
272.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TRUMP, CLINTON VOTERS DIVIDED IN THEIR MAIN

SOURCE FOR ELECTION NEWS AT 3-4 (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/
2017/01/18/trump-cinton-voters-divided-in-their-main-source-for-election-news/
[https://perma.cclDCN4-TJR4] [hereinafter PEW 2017].
273.
PEW 2014, supra note 271, at 4, 11-12; PEW 2017, supra note 272, at 3-4.
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the primary news source among conservatives, 274 and was the top
news source among Trump voters, with 40% of Trump voters
naming Fox News as their "main source" for news about the 2016
campaign.2 7 5 Although no single news source dominates for voters
on the left, CNN has been a primary news source among
liberals, 276 and CNN was the top news source among Clinton
voters, with 18% of Clinton voters naming CNN as their "main
source" of news about the 2016 campaign. 277
Although many voters used television to get their election
news, news websites, social media platforms, radio and print were
also common sources of news. 2 7 8 Material from social media
platforms and radio is difficult to aggregate, so I focused on other
media resources. Given that liberals use a broad range of news
sources, I added the New York Times, which is also a highly
trusted and commonly used news source among those on the
left. 27 9 For balance, I included the Wall Street Journal, which is
the only news source in Pew's 2014 report that was more trusted
than distrusted by all ideological groups, 280 and which has an
audience that is "relatively evenly distributed across the
[ideological] continuum"-quite unlike most news sources. 281
Thus, these four sets of news sources include two with relatively
liberal audiences (with the New York Times audience being
meaningfully more liberal than CNN's), one (WSJ) with a
relatively balanced audience, and one (Fox) that is the dominant
news source for relatively conservative audiences. 282
To search, I used Lexis's Wall Street Journal and New York
Times databases, and I used Westlaw's databases of CNN and Fox
transcripts. For the CNN and Fox transcripts, I used the entire
broadcast network transcripts rather than just the transcripts
from any one program broadcasted on the particular network. 283
Id.
274.
275.
PEW 2017, supra note 272, at 3.
276.
PEW 2014, supra note 271, at 4, 11-12.
277.
PEW 2017, supra note 272, at 3.
278.
Id. at 6.
279.
PEW 2014, supra note 271, at 4-5, 14-15.
280.
Id. at 5.
281.
Id. at 10.
282.
Id. at 9 (showing each news source's position on an ideological continuum).
283.
For the CNN Network Broadcast Transcripts, Westlaw describes the coverage as
follows: "Transcripts from CNN & CNNIH cable network news programs, both from the US
and Internationally. Coverage may vary by program. Content also available by program
database." For the Fox Network Broadcast Transcripts, Westlaw describes the coverage as
follows: "Transcripts from a broad range of FOX network news and entertainment
programming. Most databases update daily based on availability of new programs.
Coverage varies by source. Content also available by program database." Note that the Fox
transcripts include transcripts from Sean Hannity's and Bill O'Reilly's programs that are
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Within these four databases, I searched for "tax! /3 loophole!" 28 4
between June 8, 2015, and November 8, 2016. This period covers
the vast majority of the presidential campaign, and, in particular,
it includes Donald Trump's entire campaign, which began on June
16, 2015.285
I then applied the taxonomy to each search result, using the
context and the language surrounding the reference to tax
loopholes in order to infer which normative policy concern(s) (if
any) were suggested in the remarks and in order to infer which
party (or parties) (if any) the remarks suggested were responsible
for the tax loophole problem.
Based on the foregoing, I coded each search item on each of
the two dimensions of the taxonomy, using the categories
described in Part III. Several caveats are warranted about the
coding. First, the coding required many judgment calls because
speakers were rarely as explicit as the taxonomy recommends, but
most search results had some language that suggested the
speaker's or author's perspective on "loopholes." The frequency of
judgment calls means that there is imprecision in the data.
However, I reviewed and coded all of the articles/transcripts
myself, trying to handle judgments about close calls similarly
across all materials and media sources. Second, some items
provided very strong evidence of a particular policy concern or
responsible party, and others provided relatively weak evidence.
Similarly, most items expressed a concern about a particular
policy issue or critiqued a responsible party, but a few expressed
praise. The coding does not distinguish between the strength or
directionality (positive or negative) of the comments about the
particular policy issue or responsible party. 286 Third, many items
raised multiple policy concerns or implicated multiple responsible

broadcast on Fox. The database may not have 100% of the transcripts from the CNN and
Fox programs, but as long as the omissions are not skewed to omit particular types of newsrelated programs, any omissions should not meaningfully affect the insights gleaned from
this study.
I searched for tax and loophole within three words of each other because this
284.
picked up a large enough number of results to enable a meaningful analysis. At larger
proximity ranges (e.g. within five words or within ten words), there were many more
results, but these searches produced a lot more noise, picking up articles or transcripts that
used both words but not together; that is, the item was not about tax loopholes.
Donald J. Trump, Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President (June 16, 2015),
285.
http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.
Further, the coding does not tease out the extent to which the tax loophole
286.
rhetoric is used constructively (e.g., to advance tax reform) or destructively (e.g., to bully or
denigrate another person). That would be in interesting inquiry, perhaps providing insight
into political civility and attitudes, but that would be challenging and the coding already
makes many difficult judgment calls.
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parties, and the items were coded accordingly. 287 Fourth, where an
item failed to provide enough information to infer a policy concern
or responsible party, I coded the item as "unable to determine." As
discussed further below, this occurred with much greater
frequency on the responsible party dimension of the taxonomy.
Fifth, within the search results from a given database, there were
occasionally multiple results that included very similar (even
identical) language, often quoting a politician's speech. However,
if the items were really separate (e.g., a different article with a
different title on a different day, or a different transcript of a
different show that aired at a different time), the items were coded
as distinct search results. 288 Even though the language used was
the same, the repetition in a separate document reflects more
emphasis on the same concerns; different readers/listeners might
have heard it, and the repetition reinforces the importance of the
concerns in the overall discourse provided by that media source.
One additional note at this point is about the number of
search results obtained. Although taxes were a common topic for
all media sources (though much more common on CNN and Fox
than in the WSJ or the NYT), 289 the tax loophole rhetoric was
invoked relatively infrequently, both as a percentage of
articles/transcripts that mentioned taxeS 290 and as a percentage of

This explains why, on Appendices A and B, the percentages of items within a
287.
media source reflecting the particular concern sum to more than 100%.
See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Chad Bray, Pfizer Faces Limited Options After Its Dead
288.
Deal With Allergan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/071
business/dealbook/pfizer-allergan-merger.html ("President Obama said on Tuesday that
the new rules would help prevent companies from taking advantage of 'one of the most
insidious tax loopholes out there, fleeing the country just to get out of paying their taxes."');
Michael J. de la Merced & Leslie Picker, Pfizer and Allergan Said to End Merger as Tax
Rules Tighten, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/
dealbook/tax-inversion-obama-treasury.html (same); CNN Newsroom (CNN television
broadcast Aug. 18, 2016) (quoting Clinton as saying "[h]e's even created a new tax loophole
that we call the Trump loophole"); CNN: Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast
Aug. 17, 2016) (same).
289.
Searching for "tax!" during the relevant time period provides a frame of reference
for how frequently each media sources mentions taxes (i.e., without regard to whether they
invoke the loophole rhetoric). Mentions of tax (in general) on CNN (5,765 out of total 9,621
transcripts (59.9%)) and Fox (1,604 out of 3,264 total transcripts (49.1%)) were much more
frequent than mentions of tax in the NYT (9,474 out of more than 60,000 total articles (less
than 15.8%)) or the WSJ (6,165 out of more than 40,000 total articles (less than 15.5%).
Among search results for the relevant period that mentioned tax (i.e., retrieved
290.
by a search for "tax!"), 1.21% of the CNN transcripts invoked the loophole rhetoric (i.e.,
were retrieved by a search for "tax! /3 loophole!") (70 out of 5,765), 1.18% of transcripts from
Fox invoked the loophole rhetoric (19 out of 1,604), and 1.07% of NYT articles invoked the
loophole rhetoric (101 out of 9,474). WSJ invoked the loophole rhetoric at a much lower rate;
only 0.63% (39 out of 6,165) of the WSJ articles that mentioned tax also invoked the loophole
rhetoric.
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all articles/transcripts from the relevant time period. 291 This was
true across all media sources, but the WSJ invoked the tax
loophole rhetoric at a much lower rate than the other media
sources. 292 Despite the infrequency of use of the loophole rhetoric,
using the taxonomy to deconstruct how the different media sources
used the rhetoric does provide some insight into the tenor of the
different media sources' discourses about taxes and tax reform.
2. Results. The application of the taxonomy to the "tax
loophole" discourse leading up to the 2016 election reveals stark
differences in the focus of different media sources.
Briefly, the more left-leaning media, when discussing tax
loopholes, emphasized fairness concerns with relatively little
attention to economic concerns, whereas the right-leaning media
placed much heavier emphasis on economic concerns. There was
also a difference between print and television media sources, with
print media raising revenue concerns much more frequently than
television media when discussing tax loopholes. There was less
divergence among the media sources on the issue of which party
was responsible for "loopholes." All placed significant blame on
taxpayers, with Congress being the second-most frequent target of
criticism, but the print media emphasized Congress's role slightly
more.
The numerical results are provided in the appendices, and the
details and implications of these results are discussed in the
remainder of this part.
i. Policy Concerns. The "tax loophole" discourse among the
more liberal sources, CNN and the New York Times, focuses much
more on fairness than on the economy. 2 93 Seventy-five percent of
the CNN transcripts where a policy concern was discernable
raised a fairness issue, whereas only 19% raised a concern about
efficiency, neutrality or economic growth. 294 Similarly, 60% of the

291.
The tax loophole concept (i.e., based on the "tax! /3 loophole!" search) was raised
most frequently in the CNN transcripts (out of 9,621 of total transcripts from the relevant
time period, 70 raised tax loopholes within the parameters of the search (0.728%)). The Fox
transcripts invoked the tax loophole concept slightly less frequently (out of the 3,264 total
transcripts from the relevant period, 19 raised tax loopholes within the paraieters of the
search (0.582%)). Yet, the frequency with which tax loopholes were raised on CNN and Fox
was much higher than the frequency with which tax loopholes were raised in either the
NYT (101 out of more than 60,000 total articles from the relevant time period, so less than
0.17%) or the WSJ (39 out of more than 40,000 total articles from the relevant time period,
so less than 0.098%).
292.
See supra notes 290-291.
293.
See infra Appendix A. This entire part is based on Appendix A.
294.
Id.
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NYT articles with a discernable policy concern 295 raised a fairness
issue, whereas only 14% raised a concern about efficiency,
neutrality or economic growth. 296 The balance was quite different
among the Fox transcripts-50% of transcripts with a discernable
policy concern raised a concern about efficiency, neutrality or
economic growth. 297 Fifty-six percent (56%) of the Fox transcripts
with a discernable policy concern raised a fairness concern, but
given the relatively high frequency of economic issues, the balance
of the tax loophole discourse on Fox was much different than it
was on CNN and in the NYT. 2 9 8 For viewers/readers, the difference
in the experience was likely even starker than the numbers reveal
because some Fox transcripts that raised fairness concerns did so
as part of criticizing the Democrats and their fairness
arguments. 299 The WSJ discourse about "tax loopholes" was also
more balanced than CNN and the NYT as between fairness
concerns (38% of articles with a discernable policy concern) and
economic concerns (26%).300
The result revealed from the application of the taxonomy to
the media discourse about "tax loopholes" leading up to the
presidential election-that liberal media emphasized fairness and
that the conservative media was more concerned than the other
media sources about the economy-is not surprising given
analyses of voter concerns in the 2016 presidential campaign,
which suggested that many Trump voters voted based on economic
considerations and many Clinton voters were more motivated by
concerns about inequality. 301 This Article's application of the
taxonomy to the tax loophole discourse, however, adds to our
understanding of the presidential election because it provides
evidence of the very different news media experiences that voters
of different ideological perspectives may have had leading up to
the election. These very divergent media narratives about "tax
295.
All percentages are determined with reference to the number of items where a
policy concern was discernable.
296.
See infra Appendix A.
297.
See id.
298.
The impact of these discussions on viewers does, however, have to be understood
with reference to the how frequently the tax loophole rhetoric arises in each media source.
See supra notes 289-91.
299.
See, e.g., The Five (Fox television broadcast Apr. 18,2016), http://www.foxnews.com/
transcript/2016/04/18/clinton-sanders-want-wealthy-to-pay-fair-share-taxes.html. Recall that
the taxonomy identifies the topic of the policy conversation but does not distinguish between
an article/transcript that raises a policy issue to argue that the policy concern is a problem or
to argue that the policy concern is not a problem.
300.
See infra Appendix A.
301.
See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, What So Many People Don't Get About the U.S.
Working Class, HARV. Bus. REV. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-so-manypeople-dont-get-about-the-u-s-working-class.
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loopholes" may have influenced, or at least reinforced, voter
preferences about which policy issues matter the most, and thus
may have contributed to our increasingly polarized discourse
about government and politics in the U.S. Of course, this study is
limited and relates only to the "tax loophole" discourse, which,
while only a small part of the overall media discourse, 302 may be a
microcosm of the broader political discourse among the different
media sources.
Policy concerns about complexity, social policy; and other
issues were rarely mentioned, if at all, but both print media-the
WSJ and the NYT-had quite high percentage (67% and 63%
respectively) 303 of articles that raised revenue concerns. These
numbers include revenue concerns raised either on an aggregate
basis (i.e., to the fisc) or on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer basis (i.e., the
ability of a taxpayer to reduce its taxes, which in turn reduces
governmental revenue). Many of these articles raised revenue
concerns in addition to other policy concerns. In contrast, the
television media transcripts from CNN and Fox raised revenue
concerns with a much lower frequency (25% and 19%
respectively). 3 04 Perhaps this is due to the more deliberate, and
often longer, discussions in the print media as compared to often
more extemporaneous discussions that appear to be reflected in
the many of the TV news program transcripts. Also, a significant
percentage of the WSJ and NYT references to revenue are to
taxpayer-by-taxpayer
revenue reduction,
as opposed to
approaching the issue from the perspective of the fisc. 3 0 5 Focusing
only on the items that approach revenue reduction from the
perspective of the fisc result in lower frequency of revenue
concerns, but the frequency is still higher among the sampled print
media (NYT 30%, WSJ 38%) than among the sampled television
media (CNN 16%, Fox 12.5%).306
302.
See supra notes 289-91.
303.
See supranote 287 and accompanying text (explaining why percentages within a
media source add up to more than 100%).
304.
See infra Appendix A.
305.
See, e.g., Moyer, supra note 102; John S. Mitchell, Letter to the Editor, Only the
Big Boys Pay Less Tax and Can Flee, WAIL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2016, at A10 ("[B]ig American
corporations" use "incentives, loopholes and dodges" to ensure that they "pay nowhere near
the 35% tax rate.").
306.
Of the 62 NYT articles that raised a revenue concern, 29 raised the concern from
the perspective of the fisc (29 out of 98 total NYT articles with a discernable policy concern
is 29.6%). Of the 26 WSJ articles that raised a revenue concern, fifteen raised the concern
from the perspective of the fisc (15 out of 39 total WSJ articles with a discernable policy
concern is 38.4%). Of the 16 CNN transcripts that raised a revenue concern, 10 raised the
concern from the perspective of the fisc (10 out of 64 total CNN transcripts with a
discernable policy concern is 15.6%). Of the 3 Fox transcripts that raised a revenue concern,
two raised the concern from the perspective of the fisc (2 out of 16 total Fox transcripts with
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ii. Responsible Parties. There is less divergence among the
media sources on the issue of the parties responsible for the tax
sources had at least 60% of
loophole problems. All
articles/transcripts with a discernible responsible party suggesting
that the taxpayers themselves (including through their lobbyists)
were blameworthy. 307 The television media blamed the taxpayers
(82% of CNN transcripts with a discernable responsible party
blaming taxpayers, and 75% of Fox transcripts 308) slightly more
frequently than did the print media (68% of NYT articles, and 60%
of WSJ articles). 309 The legislative branch was the second-most
blameworthy party across all media sources, with print media
blaming the legislature (35% of NYT articles and 37% of WSJ
articles) slightly more frequently than television media (20% of
CNN transcripts, and 25% of Fox transcripts). 3 10 The executive
branch and tax advisors were blamed relatively rarely, with almost
no blame cast on the courts.3 11
What is striking about these results is the very heavy
emphasis, across media sources, on the taxpayers themselves as a
party that bears responsibility for "tax loopholes." And although
some of these materials blame lobbyists acting on behalf of
taxpayers, 312 much of the discourse focuses on the actual taxpayers
for their use (or abuse) of loopholes. 3 13
Caution is warranted, however, when interpreting these
results because the articles and transcripts are particularly
underdeveloped on the responsible party dimension of the
taxonomy. This is partly illustrated by the high percentage of total
a discernable policy concern is 12.5%).
307.
See infra Appendix B.
Unless otherwise stated, all percentages are determined with reference to the
308.
number of items where responsible party was discernable.
309.
See infra Appendix B.
310.
See id.
311.
Commentators in academic literature and tax practitioner publications are more
concerned about the role of the courts. See supra notes 196-200.
312.
Of the 54 NYT articles that held taxpayers responsible for loopholes, 9 implicated
lobbyists and 45 implicated taxpayers themselves; thus only 11% of the 80 total NYT
articles with a discernable responsible party implicated lobbyists. Of the 18 WSJ articles
that held taxpayers responsible for loopholes, 5 implicated lobbyists and 13 implicated
taxpayers themselves; thus only 17% of the 30 total WSJ articles with a discernable
responsible party implicated lobbyists. Of the 36 CNN transcripts that held taxpayers
responsible for loopholes, 2 implicated lobbyists and 34 implicated taxpayers themselves;
thus only 4.5% of the 44 total CNN transcripts with a discernable responsible party
implicated lobbyists. Of the 9 Fox transcripts that held taxpayers responsible for loopholes,
2 implicated lobbyists and 7 implicated taxpayers themselves; thus only 17% of the 12 total
Fox transcripts with a discernable responsible party implicated lobbyists.
313.
Of articles/transcripts with a discernable responsible party, 56% of NYT articles
(45 of 80), 43% of WSJ articles (13 of 30), 77% of CNN transcripts (34 of 44), and 58% of Fox
transcripts implicated taxpayers themselves. Id.
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search results for which a responsible party could not be
determined from the text (22.6% of NYT search results, 25% of
WSJ search results, and 37% of both CNN and Fox transcripts in
the search results). 314 As a result, there are relatively low numbers
of items that were codable on this dimension, especially for the Fox
transcripts.
Even where a responsible party is identifiable, however, the
results provide only part of the picture for two reasons.
First, many articles/transcripts that suggested taxpayers bore
responsibility also suggested that there was a problem with the
system that enabled taxpayers to use loopholes, but the articles
were not clear enough to determine the identity of the party on
whom that blame fell. 3 1 5 Had the source documents been clearer
about the party that bore responsibility for the existence of the tax
regime that allows taxpayers to use loopholes, the numbers could
have looked much different, likely with more blame on Congress.
Thus, the results of this study should not be read to suggest that
speakers/authors from these media sources believe that taxpayers
are the only ones responsible for loopholes. There is clearly more
blame to assign, but where commentators place such blame is
unclear.
One way to glean some insight about which branches of
government commentators believe bear responsibility for the
loophole problem is to look at the relative allocations of
responsibility made by each media source's articles/transcripts.
Doing so reveals that although commentators across all media
sources most frequently blame Congress, 316 the commentators on
Fox blame the executive branch more frequently than do the other
media commentators (40% of Fox transcripts where a branch of
government was identifiable as a responsible party assigned blame
to the executive branch, compared to 25% of such CNN transcripts,
15% of such NYT articles, and 14% of such WSJ articles). 317 The
numbers of articles considered in this part of the analysis are, in
314.
The percentages of undeterminable items were much lower in the first dimension
of the taxonomy. See infra Appendix A. The indeterminacy of so many items in the second
part of the taxonomy arose, in large part, because many items lamented the problem of
loopholes, but did not give any meaningful indication about who caused the problem or who
ought to fix it.
315.
See, e.g., From Hillary Clinton's Promises to Policies, supra note 129 (not clear
which branch of government is to blame for the rules that allow the problematic loopholeusing behavior by taxpayers); Patricof, supra note 113 (same).
316.
Of articles/transcripts where a branch of government was identifiable as a
responsible party, 85% of such NYT articles (28 of 33), 79% of WSJ articles (11 of 14), 75%
(9 of 12) of CNN transcripts, and 60% (3 of 5) of Fox transcripts blamed the legislature or
members thereof. See infra Appendix B.
317.
See infra Appendix B.
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some cases, quite low, so these results may not be particularly
robust. Nevertheless, these results are not surprising because Fox
reflects a more conservative perspective,3 18 and in the months
leading up to the election, the executive branch was led by a
member of the Democratic party. Thus, this analysis is consistent
with the expected narrative.
Second, many articles that blamed taxpayers for using
loopholes were relatively clear that some otherparty was expected
to fix the problei. 319 For example, articles often discussed
presidential candidates' plans to close loopholes to prevent
taxpayers from taking advantage of loopholes, 320 but that does not
necessarily imply that the presidential candidate blames the prior
president for the problem or thinks the prior president should have
solved the problem. And that also does not necessarily mean that
the presidential candidate thinks that he or she will ultimately be
solely (or even largely) responsible for fixing the problem; perhaps
he or she means that he or she will get Congress or the Treasury
to fix the problem.
Thus, the results of this study should not be read to suggest
that media commentators expect taxpayers to solve the loophole
problem. 321 Although the taxonomy provides relatively little
insight on who different commentators expect to fix the problem,
the results provide a useful starting place for understanding how
commentators from across the political spectrum assign blame for
tax loopholes. An understanding of the perceived source of the
problem is an important part of finding solutions.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article's taxonomy for tax loopholes provides a strategy
for cutting through the "loophole" rhetoric to reveal substance-

318.
See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
319.
See, e.g., Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton Twists the Knife in Trump's Tax Proposals,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/us/politics/hillary-clintontwists-the-knife-in-donald-trumps-tax-proposals.html (advocating for several loophole closing
changes to prevent taxpayers from taking advantage, but not specifying who was
responsible for the current law or who should enact the change).
See, e.g., id.; Michael C. Bender and Colleen McCain Nelson, Trump Digs In Over
320.
Taxes, Blames an "Unfair"System, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2016, 12:42 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
(Clinton
articles/donald-trump-digs-in-over-taxes-blames-an-unfair-system- 1475538309
"calling out bad corporate actors" and arguing for "closing tax loopholes" but not specifying which
parties are responsible for the current law or for fixing it).
321.
See supra Part III.B. (explaining that the taxonomy focuses on identifying the
party responsible for causing the problem, not for fixing the problem). Had the taxonomy
coded the articles and transcripts on the latter metric, even fewer articles/transcripts would
have been codable. Thus, we get more information by coding based on the party responsible
for causing the problem, even if that information is ultimately incomplete.
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substance about the policy concerns that motivate the application
of the "tax loophole" label and substance about the implied critique
about who is responsible for the problem of "tax loopholes." Ideally,
this taxonomy can overcome the empty name-calling inherent in
the use of the term "loophole" and can advance more policy-based
and actionable debate about perceived flaws in the tax system.
That hope may not be realistic in the current political
environment. But even if the taxonomy fails to change the tenor of
the discourse about individual "loopholes," it can reveal larger
political narratives, helping us to learn something about ourselves
as a society and about how different groups within our society
understand the flaws of the tax system.
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Appendix A
Dimension #1 (Policy Concern) Analysis of "Tax Loophole" Media
DiscourseDuring the 2016 PresidentialCampaign
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Appendix B
Dimension #2 (ResponsibleParty) Analysis of "Tax Loophole"
Media DiscourseDuringthe 2016 PresidentialCampaign
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